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Abstract
In the “Anfal trial,” the Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”) in Baghdad convicted five former Iraqi
high officials of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in 1988 against the
Iraqi Kurds. The evidence presented at trial—which included both voluminous documentary evidence as well as eye-witness testimony—demonstrated the clear existence of a genocidal campaign
by the former Iraqi government and military, which eliminated an estimated 182,000 Iraqi Kurds
in 1988, including through the use of chemical weapons (the eight-phased “Anfal campaign”). Ali
Hassan al-Majid al-Tikriti (“Majid”), known by the moniker “Chemical Ali,” and four others were
convicted—three of whom (including Majid) were sentenced to death. Saddam Hussein al-Majid
al-Tikriti (“Saddam Hussein”) was dropped from the proceedings after his execution following the
verdict in the Dujail trial. In the Anfal Trial Chamber judgment, the judges explained fairly persuasively how genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes were committed against the Iraqi
Kurds. The primary weaknesses of the Trial Chamber judgment include: (i) a less persuasive job
in examining individual criminal responsibility; and (ii) a failure to address fair trial problems that
arose during the trial, such as insufficiently detailed charges. On appeal, the Cassation Chamber
judges did not seriously grapple with the merits of the case. This article evaluates the successes
and failures of this trial and judgments.

WHY THE KILLING IN DARFUR
IS GENOCIDE
By Jennifer Trahan*
INTRODUCTION
The world has shamelessly stood by as the atrocities committed in Darfur, Sudan have occurred over the last several years.
While 200,000-400,0001 have been killed and an estimated 2.5
million displaced,2 all based on tribal ethnicity, pledges of “never
again” made both after the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, have once again rung hollow. It should not matter whether
* Ms. Trahan has served as both Counsel and Of Counsel to the International
Justice Program of Human Rights Watch, as Iraq Prosecutions Consultant for the International Center for Transitional Justice, and as a Defense Consultant to the Special
Court of Sierra Leone (Freetown, Sierra Leone). She has been a Visiting Lecturer with
Columbia University’s Masters in Human Rights Program, and an Adjunct Professor at
New York University’s Masters in Global Affairs Program, Fordham Law School, Brooklyn Law School and The New School. She is the author of HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE
LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2006).
Brandi Christie, Amber Lewis, Lindsay Menard-Freeman, Natalie Prokop, Seema Shah,
Julie Ann Simeone and Joel Suarez provided research assistance for this article. Olivier
Bercault and Sudan scholar Eric Reeves provided valuable additional assistance. The
views expressed herein are those of the author.
1. A survey by the Coalition for International Justice puts the fatality figures near
400,000 from February 2003 to April 2005. See Eric Reeves, Quantifying Genocide in Darfur, SUDAN TRIB., Sept. 17, 2006. Other studies have used figures of 170,000-255,000,
220,000-270,000, and even 500,000. See id.; see also Current Situation in Darfur: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 53 (2007) (statement of Hon. Tom
Lantos, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (using a figure of “as many as 400,000
people . . . .”); Eric Reeves, Quantifying Genocide in Darfur (Part I), SUDANREEVES.ORG,
Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article/02.html (putting figure at over
450,000).
2. See, e.g., Warren Hoge, U.N. Secretary General To Meet Sudanese Leader, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2007 (“An estimated 2.5 million people have been forced from their land in
Darfur . . . .”). Human Rights Watch currently appears to be using the figure 2.4 million displaced. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH [HRW], DARFUR 2007: CHAOS BY DESIGNPEACEKEEPING CHALLENGES FOR AMIS AND UNAMID 5 (2007), available at http://
hrw.org/reports/2007/sudan0907/sudan0907web.pdf [hereinafter CHAOS BY DESIGN].
As of October 2007, the Office of the United Nations (“U.N.”) Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Sudan U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator put the figure at 2,387,000 displaced, with 4.2 million “conflict-affected.”
U.N. Deputy Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Sudan Resident
and Humanitarian Co-ordinator, Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 29, at 3, Oct. 1, 2004,
available at http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/HNP%2029_narrative_1%20October%20
2007.pdf.
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the killing in Darfur is characterized as “genocide,” mass murder, extermination or ethnic cleansing for the world community—and particularly, the United Nations Security Council—to
have acted forcefully before now.3 It matters little to those on
the ground what legal nomenclature is used to characterize the
crimes by which they were killed. Yet, sometimes semantics do
appear to matter, particularly in terms of garnering media and
public attention on the crowded world stage.4 While various
countries and institutions have characterized the killing as “genocide”—including the United States Government5 and

3. The U.N. can utilize both non-forceful and forceful intervention under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter when a situation requires it to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 39; see id. art. 41 (regarding measures not
involving the use of armed force); see also id. art. 42 (regarding the use of force). Because the killing has now spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic,
there is no doubt that Chapter VII could be utilized, and could have been utilized
before now. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1672, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006) (determining that the situation in Sudan “continues to constitute a threat to international peace
and security in the region . . .”). It is widely viewed that it is the threat of China’s veto
vote that has prevented forceful Security Council action. China imports between four
percent and seven percent of its oil from Sudan and the Sudan oil project is its most
successful international oil development endeavor. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Q & A:
CRISIS IN DARFUR 5 (2007), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/05/darfur8536_txt.htm. Security Council action could have long before now taken a variety of
forms, such as protecting refugees in camps, deploying peacekeepers into Chad and the
Central African Republic, and even deploying peacekeepers into Darfur to prevent further killings. The consent of Sudan would not have been required for a forceful Chapter VII deployment.
4. As a legal matter, while early decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) suggested there was a “hierarchy” of crimes, with
genocide being the worst crime, that approach was subsequently abandoned. See William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1703, 1717 (2006). However, there still
remains a popular perception of genocide as “the crime of crimes.” See id. at 1716; see
also David Luban, Calling Genocide By Its Rightful Name: Lemkin’s Word, Darfur, and the UN
Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 306 (2006) (“To everyone in the world other than a handful of international lawyers, genocide is the ‘crime of crimes,’ regardless of what the
judges on the Appellate Chambers in The Hague say.”).
5. Colin Powell stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “genocide has been committed in Darfur.” The Crisis in Darfur: Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (statement of Secretary of State Colin Powell) (Sept. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm. Powell’s conclusions were based on interviews with 1136 randomly chosen refugees in Chad
in July and August 2004, with the findings published in a report on the State Department’s website. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR & BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES IN DARFUR 2,
4 (2004) [hereinafter DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES].

992

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:990

others6—various other key international actors, such as the
United Nations7 (“U.N.”) and certain international non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)8 have not done so. In fact, there
is good reason to conclude that the killing is genocide.
This Article details the legal requirements of the crime of
genocide, with specific emphasis on the dolus specialis —the special intent requirement of genocide.9 The Article also compiles
factual information as to the crimes that have occurred in Darfur
and demonstrates how each of the legal requirements regarding
genocide has been met. Part I provides background on the
crimes that have occurred. Part II examines the legal require6. Others who have described the situation as genocide include the Parliament of
the European Union, the Defense Minister of the Government of Germany, General
Romeo Dallaire of Canada (U.N. peacekeeping force commander in Rwanda), and a
great many international genocide scholars. See Eric Reeves, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur: A Critical Analysis (Part II), IDEA, Oct. 14, 2005, http://
www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=39. Additional groups that have declared the crisis in Darfur to be genocide include: Physicians for Human Rights, U.S. Committee for
Refugees, Africa Action, Justice Action (U.K.), Yad Vashem, Genocide Watch, and The
Campaign to Prevent Genocide. Interview with Eric Reeves (Jan. 5, 2008).
7. The U.N.’s International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was established by
Security Council Resolution 1564, and published its findings after a three-month investigation into crimes in Darfur. See S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18,
2004). The Commission deemed that some of the violations committed by Sudan and
the Janjaweed were “very likely to amount to war crimes” and “crimes against humanity.” See U.N. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur [ICID], Report to the United Nations
Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564, ¶ 630, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60
(Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf
[hereinafter Commission of Inquiry]. It suggested that “in some instances, individuals,
including Government officials” may have committed “acts with genocidal intent,” although it concluded that “the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned.” Id. ¶¶ 640-41.
Several articles have since been published discussing potential legal errors in the Commission’s conclusions. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 4, at 306; Jamie A. Mathew, The Darfur
Debate: Whether the ICC Should Determine That the Atrocities In Darfur Constitute Genocide, 18
FLA. J. INT’L L. 517 (2006); Beth Van Schaack, Darfur And The Rhetoric of Genocide, 26
WHITTIER L. REV. 1101 (2005); Eric Reeves, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur: A Critical Analysis (Part I), IDEA, Oct. 14, 2005, http://
www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=38. Additional errors are suggested in Part II.E.
of this Article.
8. Human Rights Watch, for example, has termed the killing “ethnic cleansing,”
but not “genocide.” See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC
CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN 39 (2004), available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/ [hereinafter DARFUR DESTROYED].
9. See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 45
(July 5, 2001) (“This intent [required for the crime of genocide] has been referred to
as, for example, special intent, specific intent, dolus specialis, particular intent and genocidal intent.”).
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ments of the crime of genocide—the four part “dolus specialis”
and the underlying crimes. Specifically, Part II.A examines the
requirement that there be “intent to destroy.” Part II.B discusses
the requirement that there be intent to destroy a group “in
whole or in part.” Part II.C discusses the requirement that the
intent to destroy must target “a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group.” Part II.D discusses the requirement that the
intent to destroy must target a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group “as such.” Each of these subparts also includes
factual information showing how the crimes that have
occurred in Darfur satisfy these legal requirements.10 Part II.E
examines two contrary arguments that have sometimes been
invoked to suggest the absence of genocidal intent. Finally,
Part II.F examines the elements of three underlying crimes—
killing, intentional infliction of serious bodily or mental harm,
and
intentionally inflicting upon the group conditions
calculated to bring about destruction of the group in whole or
in part—and shows, based on factual information from Darfur,
that those crimes have occurred. While the information
discussed in this Article is not evidence— that will have to be,
and presumably has been, gathered by the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”), which is investigating the crimes,11 or
by other courts—the facts compiled suggest that genocide has
occurred. The Article finishes with a brief discussion in Part III
of the challenges facing the ICC in its Darfur prosecutions.
The Article ultimately concludes that international actors
should not hesitate to call the crime genocide,12 and the ICC—
10. This information has been compiled largely from the following Human Rights
Watch reports: DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENTRENCHING
IMPUNITY: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DARFUR (2005),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/ [hereinafter ENTRENCHING
IMPUNITY]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DOCUMENTS CONFIRM GOVERNMENT POLICY
OF MILITIA SUPPORT (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/
19/darfur9096.htm [hereinafter DARFUR DOCUMENTS].
11. The situation in Darfur was referred to the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) by the U.N. Security Council. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar.
31, 2005).
12. At least one noted genocide scholar suggests the hesitation to call the crimes
“genocide” stems from a fallacious notion that if the crimes were deemed genocide,
there would be an obligation of humanitarian intervention; that scholar, however, notes
that the more logical reading of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide is that it does not require such intervention. See Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; Schabas, supra note 4, at 1718; see also Luban,
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which, to date, has issued warrants for war crimes and crimes
against humanity against two individuals regarding crimes committed in Darfur13—should consider charging the crime of genocide. Of course, none of these legal arguments should matter
because the international community should have acted long
before now, and what the killing is called should be irrelevant.
The killing should have been brought to a halt by an international force deployed by the U.N. Now that the goals of the genocide have largely been accomplished, the challenge for the
international community is to ensure that the violence is
brought to an immediate halt, those on the ground receive
needed protection, the violence does not extend further into
Chad14 and the Central African Republic,15 there is a negotiated
political settlement as to the future of Darfur, and justice for
these crimes occurs—both through robust support of the ICC
and additional justice mechanisms. Yet, if there was any doubt as
to what crime has been occurring, those doubts should be extinguished.16
supra note 4, at 306 (“the [Genocide Convention] imposes no legal obligation to act”).
Others have speculated that the U.N.’s commission of experts may have been motivated
by “crude anti-Americanism” in not deeming the situation genocide, given that the
United States had been vocal in calling it genocide. See generally Reeves, supra note 6.
13. The warrants are for Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for
the Interior and current Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd Al Rahman, known as Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed militia leader. See U.N.
Security Council, Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN
Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR1593, ¶ 2 (Dec. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Sixth Report].
14. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THEY CAME HERE TO KILL US: MILITIA ATTACKS
AND ETHNIC TARGETING OF CIVILIANS IN EASTERN CHAD (2007), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2007/chad0107/(documenting a drastic deterioration in the
human rights situation in eastern Chad, where more than 300 civilians were killed and
at least 17,000 people displaced in militia violence in November 2006); see also Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 § 3(10), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006) (referring to “Government of Sudan . . . aerial attack missions and deadly raids across the international
border between Sudan and Chad . . . .”).
15. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Security Council’s Troop Plan in
Chad/CAR Risks Failing Many: Forces Should Protect All Civilians in Danger (Sept. 27,
2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/09/27/chad/6965.htm (“Security Council
resolution 1778 focuses assistance on areas of eastern Chad and northeastern CAR
where continued armed conflict, general lawlessness, and chronic instability–-partly related to the conflict in the adjoining Darfur region of Sudan–-have exacerbated the
humanitarian crisis.”).
16. This Article does not attempt to show precisely who among the perpetrators of
the genocide bears individual and/or command responsibility within the Janjaweed or
Government of Sudan, although it does illustrate the close coordination between the
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I. BACKGROUND
The crimes in Darfur commenced in the Spring of 2003,
when Sudanese government forces and a militia force known as
the “Janjaweed”17 attacked primarily three African tribes—the
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa18—in the rural areas of Darfur, a large
area in Western Sudan. The attack was a response to the insurgency that had been led by two Darfurian rebel movements, the
Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (“SLA/SLAM”) and the Justice and Equality Movement (“JEM”).19 The Janjaweed are primarily “camel-herding nomads who migrated to Darfur from
Chad and West Africa in the 1970s, and from Arab camel-herding tribes from North Darfur.”20
The conflict has its roots in inter-communal conflict between these nomadic camel and cattle-herders, and sedentary
farmers, competing for land and water resources.21 “Until the
1970s, these tensions were kept under control by traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.”22 These tensions escalated in recent decades due to extended periods of drought, competition
for scarce resources, a lack of good governance, and the availability of weapons.23 A 1994 reorganization by the Sudanese Government of President Omar El Bashir gave Arab groups new positions of power in Darfur, which the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa
saw as an attempt to undermine their leadership roles and
Janjaweed and Sudanese armed forces in perpetrating crimes. See infra Part II.A.2.b,
II.A.2.d.
17. “The term ‘Janjaweed’ . . . is reported to be an amalgamation of three Arabic
words for ghost, gun, and horse that historically referred to criminals, bandits or outlaws.” DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 2 n.3.
18. Other communities impacted include the Dajo, Tunjur, Meidob, Jebel, Berti,
and other non-Arab tribes. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 7. It is quite
possible that these groups, also targeted on an ethnic basis, are part of the genocide.
Interview with Eric Reeves, supra note 6.
19. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 6. The army and Janjaweed’s response, however, could in no way be characterized as simply targeting the insurgents.
In many cases, there was “little or no” rebel presence when villages were targeted, and,
even if rebels were present, there was no attempt to distinguish between combatants
and non-combatants in villages under attack. See id. at 7. The Sudan Liberation Army/
Movement (“SLA/M”) and the Justice and Equality Movement (“JEM”) rebel groups
also appear to have committed serious abuses. See id.
20. DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 2. There are also cattle herding Arabs in
the Janjaweed. Interview with Eric Reeves, supra note 6.
21. See DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 2 n.4.
22. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 6.
23. See id.

\\server05\productn\F\FIN\31-4\FIN407.txt

996

unknown

Seq: 7

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

12-MAY-08

16:38

[Vol. 31:990

power.24 Hostilities broke out in West Darfur in 1998 and 1999,
resulting in hundreds killed.25 The current outbreak of largescale crimes was prompted by an SLA attack on Fasher in April
2003.26
After the attack on Fasher, the government and Janjaweed
commenced a full-scale attack upon the Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa that consisted of a combination of aerial bombardment
by Government of Sudan armed forces, with the Janjaweed moving in on horseback.27 The crimes, detailed below, have been
described as “scorched-earth tactics”28 that leave almost nothing
remaining of the villages attacked. This Article concentrates on
crimes committed in 2003 and 2004, which represent arguably
the high point of the killing in Darfur,29 and are the years at
issue in the ICC’s warrants.30 Although the killing in Darfur appears to be in decline, individuals in camps continue to be attacked,31 and other killing continues as well.32 The violence has
now spilled beyond the borders of Darfur into Chad and the
24. See id. The 1994 reorganization created the three Darfur states of North,
South and West Darfur. The effect of the reorganization was to negate in particular the
political power of the Fur, the largest ethnic group in Darfur. Interview with Eric
Reeves, supra note 6.
25. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 6-7.
26. See id. at 7.
27. See id.
28. See id.; Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 § 3(7), 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(2006).
29. See, e.g., ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 8 (“The pervasive pattern of
government-militia coordinated attacks on villages [in Darfur] has declined in 2005 in
comparison with previous years, but this is largely because most of the targeted population has already been displaced from the most fertile, desirable rural areas.”).
30. The International Criminal Court was referred the situation of Darfur by the
U.N. Security Council. See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). To
date, as a result of the International Criminal Court’s investigation, two warrants have
been issued. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
AMONG DISPLACED PERSONS IN DARFUR AND CHAD 3-9 (2005), available at http://www.
hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0505/ (documenting how Sudanese security
forces, deployed to protect displaced persons, and Janjaweed continue to commit rape
and sexual violence against women and girls in camps in Chad and Darfur); see also
CHAOS BY DESIGN, supra note 2, at 17.
32. See, e.g., Hoge, supra note 2 (reporting on U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon’s concern about the deaths of hundreds of people in the [summer of 2007] in
Darfur); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, New Clashes Jeopardize Civilians: Escalating Violence Highlights Need for Civilian Protection (Oct. 10, 2007), http://hrw.
org/english/docs/2007/10/10/darfur/7063.htm; Lydia Polgreen, Scorched-Earth Strategy Returns To Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 2008, at A1 and A16.
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Central African Republic.33 African Union (“AU”) forces, as
part of an AU observer mission (“AMIS”), were deployed starting
in July 2004,34 and a U.N./AU hybrid force has been scheduled
for a January 1, 2008 deployment.35
II. THE LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
The definition of “genocide”36 has remained essentially unchanged since the 1948 Genocide Convention.37 It requires a
showing of the dolus specialis —the “special intent” requirement
of genocide—consisting of:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

intent to destroy
in whole or in part
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group
as such.38

33. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
34. The African Union Observer Mission started in July 2004 as a small military
observer presence to monitor the April 2004 humanitarian ceasefire agreement; as of
October 2005, it had increased to approximately 7000 personnel. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 7.
35. The Security Council has authorized a January 1, 2008 deployment of 26,000
peacekeepers (UNMID) to replace the 7000 African Union peacekeepers that have
been in Sudan. Editorial, Delay, Obstruction and Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A22.
The government of Sudan has been actively obstructing deployment of the force. Press
Release, Human Rights Watch, U.N.: Security Council Should End Sudan’s Obstruction
(Dec. 19, 2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/12/18/darfur/7589.htm.
36. Raphael Lemkin coined the word “genocide” in 1944. The word is derived
“from the Greek word genos, meaning ‘race’ or ‘tribe’ and the Latin word cide, meaning
‘killing.’ ” Toby Jack, Sudan’s Genocide: Punishment Before Prevention, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L.
REV. 707, 708 (2006) (citing RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (1944)).
37. See Genocide Convention, supra note 12, art. 2. The Government of Sudan
acceded to the Genocide Convention on October 12, 2003. Office of the U.N. Comm’r
for Human Rights, Status of Ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/1.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2008). The Convention includes an obligation to extradite or prosecute perpetrators of genocide. See Genocide Convention, supra note 12,
art. 1 (“The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to
prevent and to punish.”). Crimes committed in Sudan prior to October 12, 2003 could
also constitute genocide because genocide is accepted as customary international law
and as a jus cogens norm from which no derogations are permitted. See William W.
Bishop, Jr., Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, International Court of Justice Advisory
Opinion, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 579, 584 (1951) (“[T]he principles underlying the [Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
States, even without any conventional obligation.”).
38. See generally JENNIFER TRAHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNA-
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Additionally, proof of one or more underlying crimes or acts
(the “underlying crimes”) is required.39 They are:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.40

These same requirements are today found in the Statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”),41 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”),42 the ICC,43 and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia.44 “It is widely recognised that the law set
out in the [Genocide] Convention reflect[s] customary international law and that the norm prohibiting genocide constitutes
jus cogens.”45 The United States criminalizes genocide by federal
statute.46
Additionally, to prosecute an individual for genocide, one
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 144-68 (2006) [hereinafter
ICTY DIGEST].
39. See Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 640 (Jan. 17,
2005) (“[T]he Statute characterises genocide by the following constitutive elements:
(1) one or several of the underlying acts of the offence . . . ; and (2) the specific intent
of the crime of genocide, which is described as the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”); see also Prosecutor v.
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 681 (Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Jelisić,
Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 62 (Dec. 14, 1999).
40. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
41. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
art. 4, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
42. See Security Council Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
art. 2, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
43. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 40, art. 6.
44. See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea art. 4 (2001) (Cambodia), amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004).
45. Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-06-T, Judgment, ¶ 639 (Jan. 17, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 680 (Sept. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 500 (July 31, 2003).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006).
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would require a form of individual responsibility—such as committing, instigating, ordering, planning, aiding and abetting, or
joint participation—or command responsibility.47 While these
forms of responsibility are key to proving the guilt or innocence
of a particular individual, this Article does not address the responsibility of particular individuals.
A. The Requirement of “Intent To Destroy”
1. The Legal Criteria
As to the first legal requirement of the dolus specialis— -“intent to destroy”—case law from the ICTY shows that:
(1) there must be a goal of destroying a group as a separate
and distinct entity;48
(2) even if destruction was not the original goal, it may become the goal;49
(3) there must be an intentional attack against a group, and
the intention to participate in or carry out the attack.50

Knowledge that the underlying crime would inevitably or likely
result in destruction is insufficient—destruction must be the
aim.51 Because specific intent to destroy is key, it is not necessary
to prove actual destruction of the group or groups in whole or in
47. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 40, art. 25
(describing individual responsibility); id. art. 28 (describing command responsibility).
Joint Participation has sometimes been articulated as “joint criminal enterprise,” see
ICTY DIGEST, supra note 38, at 390-438, and also the “common purpose doctrine.”
48. See Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-06-T, Judgment, ¶ 670 (“[T]he Trial Chamber
recalls that the specific intent must be to destroy the group as a separate and distinct
entity.”); see also Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 698 (“The Trial Chamber
concurs with the observation made by the Sikirica Trial Chamber that: ‘[t]he ultimate
victim of genocide is the group, although its destruction necessarily requires the commission of crimes against its members, that is, against individuals belonging to that
group.’ ”).
49. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 572 (Aug. 2, 2001)
(“It is conceivable that, although the intention at the outset of an operation was not the
destruction of a group, it may become the goal at some later point during the implementation of the operation.”).
50. See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 78 (Dec. 14, 1999)
(“[T]he Trial Chamber will have to verify that there was both an intentional attack
against a group and an intention upon the part of the accused to participate in or carry
out this attack.”).
51. See Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-06-T, Judgment, ¶ 656 (“It is not sufficient that
the perpetrator simply knew that the underlying crime would inevitably or likely result
in the destruction of the group. The destruction, in whole or in part, must be the aim
of the underlying crime(s).”).
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part, although actual destruction may constitute evidence of specific intent.52 No lengthy premeditation is required.53 A policy
or plan of “destruction” is not required, although it may be an
important factor in helping to establish that the accused possessed the requisite genocidal intent.54
a. Seeking Physical or Biological Destruction
The majority view is that destruction must intend or seek
the “physical or biological” destruction of the group or groups.
As explained by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Krstić:
The Genocide Convention, and customary international law
in general, prohibit only the physical or biological destruction of a human group. The Trial Chamber expressly acknowledged this limitation, and eschewed any broader definition. The Chamber stated: “[C]ustomary international law
limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the
physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group.
[A]n enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological
characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these
elements which give to that group its own identity distinct
52. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 522 (July 31, 2003)
(“The key factor is the specific intent to destroy the group rather than its actual physical
destruction . . . . It is the genocidal dolus specialis that predominantly constitutes the
crime.”). As specified by the ICTY:
In view of the specific intent required for genocide, it is not necessary to prove
the de facto destruction of the group in whole or in part. Nevertheless, the de
facto destruction of the group may constitute evidence of the specific intent
and may also serve to distinguish the crime of genocide from the inchoate
offences in Article 4(3) of the Statute, such as the attempt to commit genocide.
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 697.
53. See Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 572 (“Article 4 of the Statute does
not require that the genocidal acts be premeditated over a long period.”).
54. As stated in the Jelisić decision:
[T]he existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime.
However, in the context of proving specific intent, the existence of a plan or
policy may become an important factor in most cases. The evidence may be
consistent with the existence of a plan or policy, or may even show such existence, and the existence of a plan or policy may facilitate proof of the crime.
Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 48 (July 5, 2001); see Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 225 (Apr. 19, 2004)
(quoting Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 48); Brd–janin, Case
No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 705 (quoting Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 48); Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 656 (“The Appeals Chamber has held that the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal requirement of the
crime.”).
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from the rest of the community would not fall under the definition of genocide.”55

It is not, however, required that the perpetrator choose the most
efficient method of destruction.56 Acts that do not cause death
are included in destruction.57
55. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 25 (quoting Krstić,
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580); Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 694.
The contrary view has also been expressed, for example, in Blagojević, where the Trial
Chamber stated:
[T]he Trial Chamber recalls the opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, in the Krstić
Appeals Judgment, according to which a “distinction should be made between
the nature of the listed ‘acts’ [of genocide] and the ‘intent’ with which they
are done.” While the listed acts indeed must take a physical or biological
form, the same is not required for the intent. With the exceptions of the acts
listed in Article 4(2)(c) and (d), “the Statute itself does not require an intent
to cause physical or biological destruction of the group in whole or in part.”
Judge Shahabuddeen found that:
It is the group which is protected. A group is constituted by characteristics—often intangible—binding together a collection of people as a social
unit. If those characteristics have been destroyed in pursuance of the intent with which a listed act of a physical or biological nature was done, it is
not convincing to say that the destruction, though effectively obliterating
the group, is not genocide because the obliteration was not physical or
biological.
Judge Shahabuddeen concluded that “[t]he intent certainly has to be to destroy, but, except for the listed act, there is no reason why the destruction
must always be physical or biological.”
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 659 (quoting Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A,
Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶¶ 45-54).
56. The Appeals Chamber in Krstić explained:
In determining that genocide occurred at Srebrenica, the cardinal question is
whether the intent to commit genocide existed. While this intent must be
supported by the factual matrix, the offence of genocide does not require proof
that the perpetrator chose the most efficient method to accomplish his objective of destroying the targeted part. Even where the method selected will not implement the perpetrator’s intent to the fullest, leaving that destruction incomplete, this ineffectiveness alone does not preclude a finding of genocidal intent. The international attention focused on Srebrenica, combined with the
presence of the UN troops in the area, prevented those members of the VRS
[Army of Republika Srpska] Main Staff who devised the genocidal plan from
putting it into action in the most direct and efficient way. Constrained by the
circumstances, they adopted the method which would allow them to implement the genocidal design while minimizing the risk of retribution.
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 32 (emphasis added).
57. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Blagojević explained:
A broader notion of the term “destroy,” encompassing also “acts which may
fall short of causing death,” had already been considered by the ICTR. In the
Akayesu case the Trial Chamber found that acts of rape and sexual violence
formed an integral part of the process of destruction of the Tutsi as a group
and could therefore constitute genocide.
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b. Forcible Transfer May Be Part of the Destruction
Forcible transfer may be a basis from which to infer intent
to destroy.58 According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, when
considering whether the “Srebrenica massacre”59 in the former
Yugoslavia was genocide:
[F]orcible transfer could be an additional means by which to
ensure the physical destruction of the Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica. The transfer [of the women and children] completed the removal of all Bosnian Muslims from
Srebrenica, thereby eliminating even the residual possibility
that the Muslim community in the area could reconstitute itself . . . .
The Trial Chamber—as the best assessor of the evidence
presented at trial—was entitled to conclude that the evidence
of the transfer supported its finding that some members of
the VRS [Army of Republika Srpska] Main Staff intended to
destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. The fact that the
forcible transfer does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act does not preclude a Trial Chamber from relying on it
as evidence of the intentions of members of the VRS Main
Staff. The genocidal intent may be inferred, among other
facts, from evidence of “other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group.”60

On the other hand, there is some contrary authority. One trial
chamber rejected forcible transfer as a basis for inferring intent
to destroy where the number displaced was far higher than the
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 662.
58. See Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 31 (“[F]orcible
transfer could be an additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction of
the Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica.”); id., Partial Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶ 35 (“[S]tanding alone, forcible transfer is not genocide. But in
this case the transfer did not stand alone . . . .”).
59. In the Srebrenica massacre, 7000-8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were
executed after the fall of Srebrenica, a so-called “U.N. safe area,” by Republika Srpska
forces under the military control of Ratko Mladic. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
BALKANS: SREBRENICA’S MOST WANTED REMAIN FREE (2005), available at http://www.hrw.
org/english/docs/2005/06/29/bosher11228.htm. Neither Mladic, nor Radovan
Karadzic—the Republica Srpska political leader at the time—have been arrested, despite the fact that the ICTY has had arrest warrants out for them for many years. See id.;
Warren Hoge, Prosecutor Says Serbia Blocked Arrests in Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007,
at A20.
60. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 31, 33.
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number killed.61 Another trial chamber rejected deportation as
showing intent to destroy where the deportation was “not accompanied by methods seeking the physical destruction of the
group.”62
c. Distinguishing Specific Intent from Motive
The law is clear that specific intent needs to be distinguished from motive. The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blaškić 63 explained that:
Mens rea is the mental state or degree of fault which the accused held at the relevant time. Motive is generally considered as that which causes a person to act. The Appeals Chamber has held that, as far as criminal responsibility is concerned, motive is generally irrelevant in international
criminal law, but it “becomes relevant at the sentencing stage
in mitigation or aggravation of the sentence.”64
61. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 976. The Trial Chamber rejected mass deportation as evidence of special intent to commit genocide:
The extremely high number of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men, women and children forcibly displaced from the [Autonomous Region of
Krajina] in this case, particularly when compared to the number of Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats subjected to the acts enumerated in Article 4(2)(a), (b) and (c), does not support the conclusion that the intent to
destroy the groups in part, as opposed to the intent to forcibly displace them,
is the only reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence.
Id.
62. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 557, aff’d, Prosecutor v.
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 46-48 (March 22, 2006).
As explained by the Trial Chamber:
Had the aim been to kill all Muslims, the structures were in place for this to be
accomplished. The Trial Chamber notes that while approximately 23,000 people were registered as having passed through the Trnopolje camp at various
times when it was operational and through other suburban settlements, the
total number of killings in Prijedor municipality probably did not exceed
3,000.
Stakić, IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 41 (quoting Stakić, IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 553).
63. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (July
29, 2004).
64. Id. ¶ 694. The Appeals Chamber continued:
As the Appeals Chamber held in the Jelisić and Kunarac Appeal Judgements
and in the ICTR Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement:
The Appeals Chamber further recalls the necessity to distinguish specific
intent from motive. The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime
of genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal economic benefits,
or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.
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Thus, the Appeals Chamber in Stakić explained: “[T]he Tribunal’s jurisprudence distinguishes between motive and intent; in
genocide cases, the reason why the accused sought to destroy the
victim group has no bearing on guilt.”65
d. Intent to Destroy May Be Inferred
The law permits intent to be inferred.66 When “the prosecution relies upon proof of a state of mind of an accused by inThe Appeals Chamber wishes to assert the important distinction between
“intent” and “motivation.” The Appeals Chamber holds that, even if the
perpetrator’s motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does not have the intent to commit an act of torture or that his
conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, since such pain or suffering is a likely and logical consequence of
his conduct. In view of the definition, it is important to establish whether
a perpetrator intended to act in a way which, in the normal course of
events, would cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
to his victims.
The Appeals Chamber notes that criminal intent (mens rea) must not be
confused with motive and that, in respect of genocide, personal motive
does not exclude criminal responsibility providing that the acts proscribed in Article 2(2)(a) through to (e) were committed “with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”
Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 161 (June 1, 2001). Similarly, as explained in Jelisić:
The Appeals Chamber further recalls the necessity to distinguish specific intent from motive. The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of
genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of a personal motive
does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49 (July 5,
2001); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 102
(Sept. 17, 2003) (quoting Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶ 49); Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 696 (quoting Jelisić, Case No. IT-9510-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49).
65. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 45. “[A]n accused
can be found guilty of committing genocide even if his personal motivation went beyond the criminal intent to commit genocide.” Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR2000-55A-T, Judgment, ¶ 479 (Sept. 12, 2006).
66. See Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 18 (“[E]vidence
of intent to destroy may be inferred from an accused’s actions or utterances vis-à-vis the
targeted group . . . .”); Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 34 (“Where direct evidence of genocidal intent is absent, the intent may still be inferred from the factual
circumstances of the crime.”); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment,
¶ 413 (Dec. 13, 2005) (“In the absence of direct evidence, a perpetrator’s intent may be
inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.”); Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 704 (“The Trial Chamber notes that it is generally accepted in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and of the ICTR that, in the absence of direct evidence, the
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ference, that inference must be the only reasonable inference
available on the evidence.”67 Some of the factors that have been
looked to for inferring specific intent include: (a) the extent of
the actual destruction; (b) the existence of a genocidal plan or
policy; (c) the perpetration and/or repetition of other destructive or discriminatory acts committed as part of the same pattern
of conduct; (d) the utterances of the accused.68 Courts have also
looked to “the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the scale
of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on
account of their membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.”69 “It is generally accepted, particularly in the jurisprudence of both [the ICTY] and
the Rwanda Tribunal, that genocidal dolus specialis can be inferred either from the facts, the concrete circumstances, or ‘a
pattern of purposeful action.’ ”70
The targeting of military-aged men (which might, for example, suggest a tactic of eliminating a potential military threat)71
specific intent for genocide can be inferred from ‘the facts, the concrete circumstances,
or a pattern of purposeful action.’ ”).
67. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 41. “Where direct
evidence of genocidal intent is absent, the intent may still be inferred from the factual
circumstances of the crime. Where an inference needs to be drawn, it has to be the only
reasonable inference available on the evidence.” Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment,
¶ 970 (emphasis added).
68. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 971-89.
69. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, ¶ 47; Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T,
Judgment, ¶ 413.
70. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 526. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) has stated:
In the light of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, the specific intent of genocide
may be inferred from certain facts or indicia, including but not limited to (a)
the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the
same offender or by others, (b) the scale of atrocities committed, (c) their
general nature, (d) their execution in a region or a country, (e) the fact that
the victims were deliberately and systematically chosen on account of their
membership of a particular group, (f) the exclusion, in this regard, of members of other groups, (g) the political doctrine which gave rise to the acts
referred to, (h) the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts and (i)
the perpetration of acts which violate the very foundation of the group or
considered as such by their perpetrators.
Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Judgment, ¶ 320 (Dec. 13, 2006).
71. See Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 26 (“The Trial
Chamber rejected the Defence’s argument that the killing of [military-aged] men was
motivated solely by the desire to eliminate them as a potential military threat.”).
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has sometimes been considered to be part of the genocide,72
and sometimes not.73 For example, in the Krstić case, the ICTY
found the killing at Srebrenica of 7,000-8,000 Bosnian Muslim
men was genocide because the targeting of the military-aged
men was part of the destruction of the 40,000 in Srebrenica,
since without the men, the group could not procreate.74
Proof of the mental state for underlying acts or crimes may
serve as evidence from which to infer specific intent.75 It is not
72. In Krstić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, in part, reasoned that the killing of military-aged men was not just to eliminate a potential military threat because both civilians
and severely handicapped were also killed. See Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 26-27. In the situation of Darfur, both civilians and elderly
have been killed. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
73. As explained in Brd–janin:
[T]he victims of the underlying acts in Article 4(2)(a) to (c), particularly in
camps and detention facilities, were predominantly, although not only, military-aged men. This additional factor could militate further against the conclusion that the existence of genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference
that may be drawn from the evidence. There is an alternative explanation for
the infliction of these acts on military-aged men, and that is that the goal was
rather to eliminate any perceived threat to the implementation of the Strategic Plan in the [Autonomous Region of Krajina] and beyond. Security for the
Bosnian Serbs seems to have been the paramount interest. In the words of
one witness: “the aim was to reduce the threat to the detainer, the detainer’s
community, and anyone . . . who looked as if they would fight, once sent to the
other side, would be eligible for detention.”
See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 979.
74. The Appeals Chamber in Krstić explained:
The Trial Chamber determined that Radislav Krstić had the intent to kill the
Srebrenica Bosnian Muslim men of military age. This finding is one of intent
to commit the requisite genocidal act—in this case, the killing of the members
of the protected group, prohibited by Article 4(2)(a) of the Statute. From this
intent to kill, the Trial Chamber also drew the further inference that Krstić
shared the genocidal intent of some members of the VRS [Army of Republika
Srpska] Main Staff to destroy a substantial part of the targeted group, the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica.
See Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 21. It further found:
[T]he massacred men amounted to about one fifth of the overall Srebrenica
community. The Trial Chamber found that, given the patriarchal character of
the Bosnian Muslim society in Srebrenica, the destruction of such a sizeable
number of men would “inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the
Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica.” Evidence introduced at trial supported this finding, by showing that, with the majority of the men killed officially listed as missing, their spouses are unable to remarry and, consequently,
to have new children. The physical destruction of the men therefore had severe procreative implications for the Srebrenica Muslim community, potentially consigning the community to extinction.
Id. ¶ 28.
75. See id. ¶ 20 (“The proof of the mental state with respect to the commission of
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necessary to prove statements showing genocidal intent.76 An inference of genocidal intent may be drawn even where individuals with intent are not precisely identified.77
e. Destruction of Cultural and Religious Property May Be
Evidence of Intent to Destroy
Where physical or biological destruction occurs simultaneously, “attacks on cultural and religious property . . . may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group.”78
f. Sexual Violence as Part of Intent to Destroy
Case law also recognizes that sexual violence can form an
integral part of the process of destruction of a group. As the
ICTR recognized in Prosecutor v. Akayesu : the “rapes resulted in
physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their
families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral
part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the
destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.”79
2. Factual Information Suggesting “Intent to Destroy”
Is Satisfied
In the situation of Darfur, extensive factual information80
strongly suggests that “intent to destroy” exists on the part of the
Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed. Of course, in building a case against a particular individual, one would, to a large
extent, want to focus on that individual’s intent, although not
the underlying act can serve as evidence from which the fact-finder may draw the further inference that the accused possessed the specific intent to destroy.”); see also
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 706.
76. See, e.g., Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 34. (“The
absence of such statements [indicating genocidal intent] is not determinative. Where
direct evidence of genocidal intent is absent, the intent may still be inferred from the
factual circumstances of the crime.”). Id.
77. See id. (“The inference that a particular atrocity was motivated by genocidal
intent may be drawn . . . even where the individuals to whom the intent is attributable
are not precisely identified.”); see also Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 707.
78. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580.
79. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998).
80. The Author does not mean to suggest that this factual information would be
“evidence” of the crimes, but rather, that it is indicative of the type of information that
could be collected by a court (such as the International Criminal Court).
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exclusively.81 As mentioned above, the bulk of the information
cited below pertains to crimes committed in 2003 and 2004,
which have also been the years as to which the ICC’s initial investigation focused.82 By emphasizing crimes committed in those
years, this Article does not mean to suggest that crimes have not
continued—indeed, they have.83
a. The Extent of the Actual Destruction
As mentioned above, one of the indicators of whether there
has been “intent to destroy” is the scope of the actual destruc81. For example, it would be possible to show that there was “intent to destroy” by
one individual, and another individual knowingly and intentionally aided the first,
which could show that the second person was an “aider and abetter” of genocide. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Judgment, ¶¶ 330, 342 (Dec. 13,
2006) (considering the utterances of others, in determining whether the accused was
aware of the intention of the attackers to commit genocide for case of aiding and abetting genocide). Thus, as explained in Brd–janin:
Complicity in genocide, where it consists of aiding and abetting genocide,
does not require proof that the accomplice had the specific intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a protected group. In that case the Prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt “that an accused knew that his own acts assisted in the commission of genocide by the principal offender and was aware
of the principal offender’s state of mind; it need not show that an accused
shared the specific intent of the principal offender.”
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 730 (citation omitted). For aiding and abetting genocide, additionally, it must be shown that “[t]he aider and abettor carries out
acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration
of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of
civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration
of the crime.” Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶ 45 (July 29, 2004) (quoting Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 102 (Feb. 23, 2004)).
82. See Sixth Report, supra note 13, at 2. The Prosecutor recently announced an
intention to open Sudan investigations in two new areas: (a) attacks on peacekeepers,
and (b) the pattern of attacks against those who have been displaced. See U.N. Security
Council, Statement by Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court:
Statement to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR1593 (Dec. 5, 2007),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/Darfur/s0205/s0205_un.html.
83. According to Human Rights Watch, in assessing the situation in 2007:
The situation in Darfur remains grave. The violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law that Darfurians suffered in recent years have continued into 2007. Government air and ground forces have repeatedly conducted indiscriminate attacks in areas of rebel activity, causing numerous civilian deaths and injuries. Looting, beatings, murder, and rape perpetrated primarily (but not exclusively) by government forces, Janjaweed, and former
rebels have created a climate of fear that impinges on everyday life for millions
of people in towns, villages, and displaced persons camps.
CHAOS BY DESIGN, supra note 2, at 14; see also Polgreen, supra note 32.
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tion, although extensive actual destruction is not required.84
Here, estimates are that 200,000-400,000 have been killed85 and
2.5 million displaced.86 Large swaths of rural Darfur have been
emptied of their original populations.87 These facts and those
detailed further below clearly suggest that there has been extensive actual destruction.
b. The Perpetration and/or Repetition of Destructive or
Discriminatory Acts Committed as Part of the Same
Pattern of Conduct
Here, one clearly sees the perpetration and/or repetition of
destructive or discriminatory acts committed as part of the same
pattern of conduct—another factor from which genocide may
be inferred.88
The attacks, at least during the period in question, form a
clear pattern: (i) there has been clear coordination between the
Janjaweed and Government of Sudan forces to target the Fur,
Masalit and Zaghawa; (ii) the Sudanese military forces89 commence with aerial bombardment using Antonovs and MiG
planes and attack helicopters;90 (iii) the Janjaweed then move in
on foot to kill, loot, burn and perpetrate other crimes at close
range, while government forces move in by Land Cruisers; (iv)
sometimes military gunships reappear a few days after the initial
84. As stated in Brd–janin:
In view of the specific intent required for genocide, it is not necessary to prove
the de facto destruction of the group in whole or in part. Nevertheless, the de
facto destruction of the group may constitute evidence of the specific intent
and may also serve to distinguish the crime of genocide from the inchoate
offences in Article 4(3) of the Statute, such as the attempt to commit genocide.
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36T, Judgment, ¶ 697.
85. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
87. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 26.
88. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 893-94.
89. Some of the Sudanese armed forces who participated in attacks in Darfur are
believed to come from the first and sixth Infantry Divisions. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY,
supra note 10, at 33.
90. According to Human Rights Watch, “[t]he rebel groups in Darfur do not have
aircraft, so it can be assumed that the Antonov and MiG planes and attack helicopters
used to bomb villages belong to the Sudanese armed forces. In addition, eyewitnesses
have seen the Antonovs, MiGs, and helicopters at government airports in Darfur.” DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 7 n.10. The Antonovs dropped “barrel bombs” filled
with metal shards. Id. at 24.
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attacks, as if to verify that the village had been destroyed.91
For example, witness statements reveal the pattern of bombardment by government armed forces with the Janjaweed following on horseback to commit crimes at close range:
• Sildi was attacked, first by air and then by land, on February
7, 2004. Abdul, a forty-two-year-old farmer, said two Antonovs
bombed first, destroying two huts and sending women and children running for shelter in the hills. “Then the Janjaweed and
the government came,” he said. “Twelve were killed in the village, then it was burned. Some were killed point-blank.”92
• Another farmer, forty-year-old Ahmad, said he saw only one
Antonov—at 8:00 a.m. “At 9:00 am,” he said, “the Janjaweed
came with horses and camels and behind them the army with cars.”
In the next few days, thirty villages of Sildi were looted and
burned.93
• Tunfuka was attacked, by air and land, on February 7, 2004,
killing at least twenty-six people, according to villagers now in
Chad. Izhaq, a twenty-four-year-old farmer, said two Antonovs
bombed for an hour and killed eight people —including three men,
three children and two old women. He said seven camels and
thirteen cows were killed, and the village began to burn. The
army arrived in vehicles and the Janjaweed followed an hour later,
91. According to Human Rights Watch:
Gunships have also been used to reconnoitre villages immediately after they
have been burned and attacked – arriving within one to three days of the
initial attacks, according to villagers. Sheikh Abdullah of Terbeba said gunships and Antonovs flew over Terbeba three or four days after the village was
destroyed. “They did not bomb,” he said. “We think they were looking – to
see what was there and to make sure the village was empty.”
Id. at 25. One report, published on the U.S. Department of State website, characterizes
the “pattern” of attacks slightly differently:
1) GOS [Government of Sudan] aircraft or helicopters bomb villages.
2) GOS soldiers arrive in trucks, followed closely by Jingaweit militia riding
horses or camels.
3) GOS soldiers and militia surround and then enter villages, under cover of
gunfire.
4) Fleeing villagers are targets in aerial bombing.
5) The Jingaweit and GOS soldiers loot the village after most citizens have
fled, often using trucks to remove belongings.
6) Villages often experience multiple attacks over a prolonged period before
they are destroyed by burning or bombing.
DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note 5, at 5.
92. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 17 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Abdul on March 29, 2004) (emphasis added).
93. Id. (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Ahmad on March 29, 2004)
(emphasis added).
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shouting racial abuse, shooting eighteen people dead and
looting the cattle.94
• “On February 10, 2004, Antonov planes bombed the village
of Tullus in advance of an attack on the village by
Janjaweed.”95
• “Antonovs bombed Habila six times that day,” he said.
“Twenty-four people were killed. All were civilians.”96
• “The attack [on Terbeba] was done by some 300 Janjaweed
on horses and camels, accompanied by four government
cars—three Land Cruisers carrying soldiers and a Renault for
logistics [ammunition].”97

Countless similar accounts exist.98 Those taking eye-witness testimony have concluded that: “Villages were not attacked at random, but were emptied across wide areas in operations that reportedly lasted for several days or were repeated several times
until the population was finally driven away.”99
As part of these attacks, as detailed further below, a panoply
of crimes have been committed, including murder—not only of
military-age men, but also of children, women and the elderly—
mass executions,100 torture, rape, individuals being buried alive,
detentions, denial of access to medical treatment,101 looting,
theft of cattle, destruction of food stocks, destruction of
mosques, and burning of villages.102
94. Id. at 18 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Izhaq, Chad on April 14,
2004) (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 25.
97. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
98. See generally, DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8; ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra
note 10.
99. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 26.
100. See infra Part II.F.1.
101. See infra Part II.F.2.
102. See infra Part II.F.3. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry found that the crimes
committed in Darfur included:
[I]ndiscriminate attacks on civilians, killing of civilians, killing of detained enemy servicemen, killing of wounded enemy servicemen, wanton destruction of
villages or devastation not justified by military necessity, forcible transfer of
civilian populations, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, outrages
upon personal dignity and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, plunder,
unlawful confinement, incommunicado detentions and enforced disappearances, and recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 in armed
hostilities.
Mathew, supra note 7, at 535-36.
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As to the coordination between the Government of Sudan
(or its armed forces) and the Janjaweed militias, that can be seen
not only from their joint operations, but the fact that, as detailed
further below, Sudanese armed forces have recruited the
Janjaweed, and provided them with weapons, ammunition,
uniforms, communication equipment and vehicles.103
c. Ethnically Charged Utterances
There are numerous accounts of racially charged epithets
accompanying the killing—another factor that is used to infer
genocidal intent.104 For example, eyewitnesses have stated:
• “They came into Kondoli saying: ‘Kill the Nuba! Kill the
Nuba!’ They shot a child who was lying on the ground because he was afraid. They said: ‘Get up so we can see you.’
But he was afraid. So they shot him. He was called Maji
Gumr Zahkariah and he was three years old.”105
• “[S]even army Land Cruisers came. The Janjaweed arrived
an hour later. They burned the village, rounded up the cattle
and shot people who were running away. They killed eighteen people. Then the Janjaweed left with the cattle followed
by the government. The Janjaweed were shouting: ‘Kill the
Nuba!’”106
• “The Janjaweed were shouting: ‘Kill all the Nuba!’ About 90
percent of them were wearing army uniforms and the rest
were in ordinary clothes.”107
• “It was 2:30 p.m., time for prayers. The Janjaweed went in,
on foot and on horseback, and killed ten people including
the imam, Yahya Gabat. Then they turned and started shooting into the market. The bullets were falling like rain and
they were shouting: ‘Kill the Nuba! Kill the Nuba!’ They killed
my seventy-five-year-old aunt, Kaniya Hassan, because she re103. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 65.
104. See Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 985-88 (September 1, 2004); see also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 52 (March 22, 2006) (“[E]thnic slurs . . . might reasonably be understood
as an implied call for the group’s destruction.”).
105. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 14-15 (emphasis added). “Nuba” refers
to people from the Nuba Mountains of central Sudan, but is used derogatorily by
Janjaweed and others to refer to ethnic Africans. Id. at 15 n.29; see also ENTRENCHING
IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 16 n.35.
106. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 18 (describing the attack in Tunfuka)
(emphasis added).
107. Id. at 20 (describing the attack on Terbeba) (emphasis added).
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fused to let them take her sheep and goats.”108
• “The Janjaweed came and surrounded the market. At first
people thought they had come to protect it. But then they
began to shout: ‘Kill the Nuba!’ and they attacked. They had
RPGS and M79 grenade launchers and killed many people
and stole everything from the market.”109
• “The Janjaweed brought camels into the village and they ate
all the sorghum. They burned the village and stole all my
things–including fourteen cows. They were shouting: ‘Kill
the Nuba! Kill the Nuba!’ All this is because we are black. We
could defend ourselves against the Arab nomads, but not
against the Janjaweed. The government has given them very
good guns and attacks with them.”110
• Adam, a thirty-two-year-old farmer burned out of Gokar village near Geneina, said a Janjaweed leader in Geneina, Omda
Saef, told local people: “This place is for Arabs, not Africans.”111
• One victim described radio conversation he had overheard
from Sudanese army pilots: “in their conversations on the radio they called us ‘Nuba, abid,’ and said things like, ‘I am
going to give those slaves a lesson they will not forget.’”112
• A twenty-seven-year-old Fur man from Arwalla who was arrested and beaten said those doing the beatings insulted the
victims, saying: “You slaves, this is not your country.”113
• An eyewitness to the August 15, 2003 attack on Bindisi said
that the leader of the attack, Ali Kosheib,114 was screaming
during the attack: “Nuba, Nuba, you are monarada [opposition], you are all slaves.”115

Those being attacked have explained: “The government wants
108. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). The African tribes refer to themselves as “black,”
as a way of distinguishing themselves from the Janjaweed attackers. It should be noted,
however, that the Janjaweed are also dark in skin color.
111. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
112. ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 16 (quoting a Human Rights Watch
interview conducted in a refugee camp in Chad on June 29, 2005) (emphasis added).
“Abid” is Arabic for slave. Id.
113. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
114. Kosheib was also described as giving orders during the attack, and present
during a March 2004 attack on Tanako. Id.
115. Id. (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview conducted in a refugee camp
in Chad on June 27, 2005) (emphasis added). The most commonly used epithets are
“abid” (slave) and “zurga” (blue/black or dirty/black). “Nuba” is not used more commonly than those. Interview with Eric Reeves, supra note 6.
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to kill all African people, Muslim or not Muslim, so as to put
Arabs in their places,”116 and “they killed everything black . . .
they don’t want African tribes in this place.”117 The Janjaweed
have also been described as rendering “Arabization” services to
the Government of Sudan.118 According to survivors who fled an
attack on Hamada on January 13-14, 2005, the Janjaweed attackers repeatedly stated their intention of “cleaning the whole
area.”119
d. The Existence of a Genocidal Plan or Policy
There also appears to be both inferential evidence of a joint
Government of Sudan/Janjaweed “plan or policy” of destruction, and possibly actual evidence of such a “plan or policy.” As
noted above, the law suggests that a plan or policy of destruction
can be a strong indicator of intent, although it is not required.120
The coordination between the Government of Sudan
armed forces and the Janjaweed—discussed above—suggests
that there was a plan to attack the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa.
Additionally, it is possible that command and control lines were
or are actually intertwined:121
116. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 28.
117. Id. at 27.
118. See id. at 29.
119. ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 55 (quoting interviews with displaced people from Hamada conducted in January, 2005). As explained by a report on
the U.S. State Department website:
Numerous credible reports corroborate the use of racial and ethnic epithets
by both the Jingaweit and GOS military personnel; “[k]ill the slaves; [k]ill the
slaves!” and “[w]e have orders to kill all the blacks” are common. One refugee
reported a militia member stating, “[w]e kill all blacks and even kill our cattle
when they have black calves.”
DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note 5, at 5.
120. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing legal requirements for
the existence of a plan or policy); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 260 (Nov. 27, 2007) (“[A]ccording to the jurisprudence of this
Tribunal as well as that of the ICTY the existence of an agreement or a plan is not an
element required for a conviction for genocide.”). As to the U.N. Commission of Inquiry’s conclusion that “no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented in
Darfur,” Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, ¶ 642, not only is the law clear that there
need not be a genocidal policy, but the facts below clearly suggest that the killing has
been pursuant to a plan or policy.
121. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 32 (suggesting that responsibility
for Sudanese military and possibly Janjaweed crimes would go up the chain of command to former Minister of Defence Maj. Gen. Bakr Hassan Salih, Chief of Staff Abbas
Arabi, and President El Bashir as the Commander-in-Chief).
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• For example, in a remarkable admission, one Sudanese
army official stated that all of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal’s
operations were under the control of the army.122
• Some Janjaweed appear to have been incorporated into various units of the security forces or the Central Reserve Police.123
• On one occasion, Janjaweed Commander Musa Hilal was
overheard prior to a February 27, 2004 attack on Tawila on
“Thurayas [satellite phone] with someone in Khartoum, to arrange the point where the plane should land to bring the required ammunition” to the Janjaweed.124
• Additionally, a forty-two-year old Zaghawa man reported
that Janjaweed commander Musa Hilal gave “orders to both
soldiers and Janjaweed.”125
• At a mass execution of several hundred men at Wadi Saleh,
discussed further below,126 high level government officials127
were present while the Janjaweed and soldiers carried out the
attacks;128 Wadi Saleh victims were first detained in police or
military custody prior to execution by the Janjaweed and
soldiers.129
• As part of several attacks on villages in the Kutum area, a
former Sudanese army soldier heard a Sudanese army commander named Major Gaddal Fadlallah give clear instructions to attack civilians, stating: “On your way, every house
and village needs to be burned completely. I do not want to
see any left after the battle.” He added: “All men, even civilians that you see should be killed.”130 Others observed that
122. See id. at 12 (citing a Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Gen. Mohamed
Fazey of the Sudan army in Fashir, North Darfur, on Oct. 6, 2004).
123. See id. at 54.
124. Id. at 17 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview with a trader in North
Darfur on Oct. 4, 2004).
125. Id. at 18 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in a refugee camp in
Chad on July 2, 2005).
126. See infra Part II.F.1.
127. The then-commissioners of Mukjar, El Tayib Abdallah Torshain, and of Garsila, Ja’afar Abdul el Hakh, were present. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at
24.
128. See id. The Janjaweed were commanded by “Ali Kosheib,” which is apparently
the nom de guerre of Ali Mohammed Ali, an ex-army soldier. See id. at 25.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 44 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview with a former army soldier in Darfur on July 14, 2005).
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the Janjaweed were “commanded by a military officer.”131
• Sudanese security officials are believed to serve as liaisons
with Janjaweed leaders, and military intelligence is believed to
have been a conduit for supplies for the Janjaweed.132
• The Janjaweed have also stated “we are the government”133
and wear uniforms similar to government uniforms.134

It is also clear that the Government of Sudan has taken no serious steps to prevent or punish those implicated in crimes.135 Indeed, recently, the government of Sudan promoted Janjaweed
militia leader, Musa Hilal to an official government position.136
All of this coordinated action by the Janjaweed and Government
armed forces is circumstantial evidence that there was a joint
plan to attack the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa.
Furthermore, there is some suggestion that there may have
been an actual plan memorialized in government memoranda.
For example, there appear to be government documents that
authorize the recruitment and arming of the Janjaweed militia,
“provision of military support to allied ethnic groups, and in one
case, provid[ing] relative impunity for abuses committed by
Janjaweed militia members against civilians.”137 For example:
• A November 22, 2003, letter from South Darfur governor
Adam Hamid Musa to the commissioner of Nyala and thencommissioner of Kass requests the commissioners to “prepare
for the recruitment of three hundred knights [Janjaweed] for
131. Id. at 45 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Khartoum on October
21, 2004).
132. See id. at 51.
133. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 14, 30. “ ‘We are the government!’ Time
and again, members of Darfur’s Masalit community told Human Rights Watch that this
was the response of the Janjaweed—at checkpoints, in the streets, in the course of robberies or cattle rustling—whenever civilians attempted to defend themselves and their
property.” Id. at 42.
134. See id. at 45 (noting that the Janjaweed are “headed by officers who wear the
same stripes as generals in the regular army. The only difference between Janjaweed
and army uniforms, Masalit say, is a badge depicting an armed horseman that the
Janjaweed sport on their breast pocket.”).
135. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 63. The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General has also concluded
that “[t]he Sudanese justice system is unable and unwilling to address the situation in
Darfur.” Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, at 5.
136. See Sudan Gives Advisor Role to Militia Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at A8.
137. DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 4.
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Khartoum.”138
• Another memorandum dated February 12, 2004, outlines
the necessary step of “designing a plan for resettlement operations of nomads [Janjaweed] in places from which the outlaws [African Tribes] withdrew . . . .”139
• A further memorandum dated February 13, 2004 orders security units to “allow [or permit] the activities of the
mujahadeen and the volunteers under the command of
Sheikh Musa Hilal [the Janjaweed] to proceed in the area of
[North Darfur] and to secure their vital needs.”140
• The document continues: “We also highlight the importance of non-interference so as not to question their authorities and to overlook minor offences by the mujahadeen
[Janjaweed] against civilians who are suspected members of
the rebellion . . . .”141
• Another document, marked “highly confidential” provides
that the Janjaweed will “protect” internally displaced Darfurians in camps.142
• An unauthenticated document seized from a Janjaweed official, dated August 2005, calls for the “execution of all directives from the president of the republic.” The document
urges regional commanders and security officials to:
“Change the demography of Darfur and make it void of African tribes,” and encourages “killing, burning villages and
farms, terrorizing people, confiscating property from members of African tribes and forcing them from Darfur.”143

As mentioned above, there are also references to “Arabization”
being conducted,144 so that the plan may in fact have a name
(although it is unclear whether those who perpetrated or
planned the killings used that term).
138. ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 22; DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note
10, at 7.
139. ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 23.
140. Id. at 23; DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 5.
141. DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 5.
142. See id. at 9 (citing the “highly confidential” February 2004 memorandum).
143. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Secret Genocide Archive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at
A19. Kristof noted that the document is possibly a forgery, although the African Union
believes it to be authentic. See id.; see also WILLIAM G. O’NEILL & VIOLETTE CASSIS,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTE-UNIV. OF BERN, PROTECTING TWO MILLION INTERNALLY DISPLACED:
THE SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN DARFUR (2005).
144. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 28-29.
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e. Destruction of Cultural and Religious Property as Added
Evidence of Intent to Destroy
The attacks also show destruction of “cultural and religious
property” which, while not in and of itself a form of genocide,
again helps to show intent.145
As to the destruction of cultural property, for example, the
U.S. Congress and Human Rights Watch, as mentioned above,
have characterized the joint Government of Sudan and
Janjaweed militia attacks as “scorched-earth tactics,”146 in which
everything within the villages in Darfur has been destroyed:
Since August 2003, wide swathes of [the homelands]of the
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa], among the most fertile in the region, have been burned and depopulated. With rare exceptions, the countryside is now emptied of its original Masalit
and Fur inhabitants. Everything that can sustain and [succor]
life—livestock, food stores, wells and pumps, blankets and
clothing—has been looted or destroyed. Villages have been
torched not randomly, but systematically—often not once,
but twice.147

Because virtually nothing is left remaining of villages that were
attacked, any cultural property was destroyed.
As to the destruction of religions property, there are accounts of Government and Janjaweed forces having “burned at
least sixty-five mosques in Dar Masalit.”148 The “Janjaweed who
attacked Urum in November 2003 killed . . . the imam and his
orphaned three-year-old grandson.”149 The “Janjaweed also rode
into the mosque in Mulli and shot dead ten people including
the imam . . . .”150 There are also reports of Janjaweed defecating on Korans.151
f. Sexual Violence as Added Evidence of Intent to Destroy
Finally, the law also suggests that sexual violence can help
145. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Aug. 2, 2001).
146. Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 § 3(7), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006);
DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 7.
147. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 2.
148. Id. at 28. Human Rights Watch has created a list of some of the mosques that
were burned in Dar Masalit. See id. at 66, Appendix C.
149. Id. at 28.
150. Id.
151. See id.
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show intent to destroy.152 There are numerous eyewitness accounts of rape. For instance, according to testimony of one survivor: “The Janjaweed took girls into the grass and raped them
there—in Dingo and Koroma. They raped thirteen including
eighteen-year-old Khadija.”153 “Near Sissi, three women, aged
thirty-two, twenty-two and twenty-five, were abducted at a water
hole and taken to Nouri school, which was abandoned, and were
raped.”154 “In the village of Dureysa, on the Masalit-Fur border,
a seventeen-year-old girl who resisted rape was killed and her naked body left on the street.”155 Between November 30 and December 2, 2004, those women and girls who had not managed to
leave Adwah were raped.156 As part of the January 13-14, 2005
attack on Hamada, the Janjaweed raped women and girls, some
repeatedly.157 One woman reported being raped repeatedly by
Sudanese military and Janjaweed in front of her father; afterwards, her father was dismembered in front of her.158 Another
woman was held for a week against her will and repeatedly raped
in front of her nine-month-old daughter; they eventually escaped to a refugee camp in Southern Chad.159 According to
Human Rights Watch, “[r]ape appears to be a feature of most
attacks in Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa areas of Darfur;” however,
the extent of the rape is difficult to determine because the subject is not freely discussed.160 One survey reported that sixteen
percent of respondents indicated that they had been raped or
152. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2,
1998).
153. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 10 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Chad on March 28, 2004).
154. Id. at 34 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview in Feisal, Darfur, on April
5, 2004).
155. Id.
156. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 38.
157. See id. at 43.
158. See DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note 5, at 5.
159. See id.
160. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 33. Congress has referred to “the
systematic rape of thousands of women and girls . . . .” Comprehensive Peace in Sudan
Act of 2004 § 3(9), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006). For an extensive discussion of rape in
Darfur, see TARA GINGERICH & JENNIFER LEANING, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV./OTI, THE
USE OF RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR IN THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR, SUDAN (2004), available
at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/the-use-of-rapeas-a-weapon.pdf. A Darfurian NGO had documented 9,300 cases of rape by 2004. Id. at
16.
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heard of someone being raped.161
g. Displacement in Deplorable Conditions as Added Evidence
of Intent to Destroy
As mentioned above, the law is somewhat unsettled whether
displacement can be viewed as an additional indicator of “intent
to destroy,” although the majority view appears to be that it
can.162 Accordingly, a possible additional argument would be
that the conditions in which the displacement occurred were so
deplorable that they suggested a more slow moving, but nonetheless lethal, attempt to destroy, among others, the Fur, Masalit
and Zaghawa.163 The argument would be that because: (a) the
conditions of displacement—where those displaced had no
“means of sustenance or shelter”164—were insufficient to sustain
life;165 and (b) attacks have continued against displaced persons
in “camps,” the way in which the displacement occurred provides added indications of intent to destroy. Indeed, Human
Rights Watch has concluded:
The subsequent denial of humanitarian assistance to this population by the government of Sudan, in conditions where the
population has been rendered entirely dependent on relief,
can also be considered as part of a strategy to weaken and
perhaps destroy a large proportion of the displaced population and prevent their return to their home villages.166

As to the displacement occurring in deplorable conditions,
that cannot be denied. Civilians displaced into camps have suffered tremendously due to inadequate humanitarian assistance—which has sometimes even been blocked by the Govern161. See DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note 5, at 5.
162. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
163. The crime of “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction” covers methods of destruction by which
the perpetrator does not immediately kill group members, but which, ultimately, seek
their physical destruction. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 517
(July 31, 2003).
164. Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 § 3(12), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2004)
(discussing the Sudanese government’s restriction of access on humanitarian and
human rights workers to the Darfur area).
165. Indeed, one estimate is that “one in three children in the refugee settlements
in Chad is suffering from acute malnutrition.” DOCUMENTING ATROCITIES, supra note 5,
at 3.
166. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 40.
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ment of Sudan.167 Those displaced have largely been deprived
of their assets, land, security, and freedom of movement; because they are confined in camps and unable to access their land
or even the wild foods, markets, and labor migration that could
normally sustain them in times of crisis, they are entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance.168 As to crimes continuing
against those displaced, eyewitness accounts indicate that militias
continue to attack displaced civilians, “beating women and children who attempt to leave these settlements in order to collect
firewood, wild foods or other essential items, and sometimes killing them; women have been raped.”169 According to a 2007 report:
People forced to flee their homes who make it into the camps
invariably find themselves trapped there. If they venture
outside to collect firewood, farm, or attempt to return to their
villages they risk being harassed, robbed, beaten, or murdered by Janjaweed or other armed men. Women and girls
attempting to carry out the routine activities of daily life are
often sexually harassed and raped by these armed men, who
include government forces or even former rebels who once
claimed to be fighting on behalf of their victims. Insufficient
security in the camps has exacerbated problems of domestic
violence and sexual exploitation.170

Men have also been tortured and killed.171
Accordingly, in the situation of Darfur, there is a plethora of
factual information suggesting the existence of “intent to destroy.” In fact, virtually every indicator that the law suggests as to
“intent to destroy” appears to be present. One has to wonder, if
this is not enough evidence of “intent to destroy,” what evidence
would be enough? Raphael Lemkin—who coined the term “genocide”172—clearly indicated that “genocide” did not need to
wait until entire groups were actually destroyed; that is why genocide is an intent crime, and prohibits destruction of protected
groups not only “in whole” but “in part.”173
167. See id. at 50.
168. See id. at 58-59.
169. Id. at 42.
170. CHAOS BY DESIGN, supra note 2, at 17.
171. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 42.
172. See Jack, supra note 36, at 708.
173. See Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, ¶ 412 (Dec. 13,
2005) (“To find an accused guilty of the crime of genocide it must be established that
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B. The Requirement of “In Whole or In Part”
1. The Legal Criteria
The next requirement of genocide’s dolus specialis is that
there be intent to destroy a group or groups “in whole or in
part.” As to this requirement, case law explains that there must
be intent to destroy a distinct part of the group, not isolated individuals within it:174
Although the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy the entire group protected by the Convention, they
must view the part of the group they wish to destroy as a distinct entity which must be eliminated as such. A campaign
resulting in the killings, in different places spread over a
broad geographical area, of a finite number of members of a
protected group might not thus qualify as genocide, despite
the high total number of casualties, because it would not
show an intent by the perpetrators to target the very existence
of the group as such. Conversely, the killing of all members
of the part of a group located within a small geographical
area, although resulting in a lesser number of victims, would
qualify as genocide if carried out with the intent to destroy
the part of the group as such located in this small geographical area.175
he committed any of the enumerated acts . . . with the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a group, as such, that is defined by one of the protected categories of
nationality, race, ethnicity, or religion.”).
174. As explained by the Trial Chamber in Brd–janin:
[U]nder the Genocide Convention, the terms “in whole or in part” speak to
the intended scope of destruction, as opposed to the actual destruction of the
group . . . . The Trial Chamber agrees with the Krstić and Stakić Trial Chambers that “the intent to destroy a group, even if only in part, means seeking to
destroy a distinct part of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated
individuals within it.”
Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 700 (Sept. 1, 2004); see Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 (July 31, 2003). The Trial Chamber in Krstić explained:
[T]he intent to destroy a group, even if only in part, means seeking to destroy
a distinct part of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated individuals within it. Although the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy
the entire group protected by the Convention, they must view the part of the
group they wish to destroy as a distinct entity which must be eliminated as
such.
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 590 (Aug. 2, 2001).
175. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 590.
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a. Requirement of a “Substantial Part”
Where the entire group is not targeted for destruction, but
only a “part” of the group, case law specifies that the part of the
group targeted must be a “substantial” part of the whole
group.176 Thus, the Appeals Chamber in Krstić explained:
It is well established that where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a protected group “in part,” the
part must be a substantial part of that group. The aim of the
Genocide Convention is to prevent the intentional destruction of entire human groups, and the part targeted must be
significant enough to have an impact on the group as a
whole.177

The Appeals Chamber in Krstić further opined on when the
176. See, e.g., Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, ¶ 412 (“Although there is
no numeric threshold, the perpetrator must act with the intent to destroy at least a
substantial part of the group.”); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T,
Judgment, ¶ 479 (Sept. 12, 2006) (“While there is no upper or lower limit to the number of victims from the protected group, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy at least a substantial part
of the group.”).
177. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 8. The Krstić decision continued:
The question has also been considered by Trial Chambers of the ICTR, whose
Statute contains an identical definition of the crime of genocide. These
Chambers arrived at the same conclusion. In Kayishema, the Trial Chamber
concluded, after having canvassed the authorities interpreting the Genocide
Convention, that the term “ ‘in part’ requires the intention to destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of the group.” This definition was
accepted and refined by the Trial Chambers in Bagilishema and Semanza, which
stated that the intent to destroy must be, at least, an intent to destroy a substantial part of the group.
Id. ¶ 9.
In the Krstić case, the Appeals Chamber held that “[t]he intent requirement of
genocide under Article 4 of the Statute is therefore satisfied where evidence
shows that the alleged perpetrator intended to destroy at least a substantial
part of the protected group.” It further stated that “the substantiality requirement both captures genocide’s defining character as a crime of massive proportions and reflects the Convention’s concern with the impact the destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of the group.”
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 701; see Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 634 (“[A]n intent to destroy only part of the group must nevertheless concern
a substantial part thereof, either numerically or qualitatively.”); Prosecutor v. Jelisić,
Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 82 (Dec. 14, 1999) (“[I]t is widely acknowledged that
the intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part of the group.”) (citation
omitted); Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 10-11 (discussing
the sources of the “substantial part” requirement, including Raphael Lemkin, who
coined the term genocide and was instrumental in drafting the Genocide Convention).
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targeted part of the group satisfies the “substantial part” requirement:
The determination of when the targeted part is substantial
enough to meet this [substantial part] requirement may involve a number of considerations. The numeric size of the
targeted part of the group is the necessary and important starting
point, though not in all cases the ending point of the inquiry.
The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated not
only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size
of the entire group. In addition to the numeric size of the
targeted portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful
consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of
the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial within the
meaning of Article 4.178

b. Destruction May Be Limited to a Geographical Zone
Case law also establishes that destruction may be limited to a
geographical zone.179 Thus, the Trial Chamber in Krstić explained: “the physical destruction may target only a part of the
geographically limited part of the larger group because the perpetrators of the genocide regard the intended destruction as sufficient to annihilate the group as a distinct entity in the geographic area at issue.”180 Thus for example, the Trial Chamber
in Stakić suggested that destruction even within a single municipality might constitute genocide,181 although it noted that that
approach “might distort the definition of genocide if it is not
applied with caution.”182
178. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 12, 14 (emphasis
added).
179. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 703 (“[T]he jurisprudence of
the Tribunal supports the approach that permits a [characterization] of genocide even
when the specific intent to destroy a group, in part, extends only to a limited geographical area.”); see also Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 83.
180. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 590.
181. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 523 (July 31, 2003).
182. Id. (“In construing the phrase ‘destruction of a group in part,’ the Trial
Chamber with some hesitancy follows the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda
Tribunals which permits a [characterization] of genocide even when the specific intent
extends only to a limited geographical area, such as a municipality.”); see also Luban,
supra note 4, at 313 (arguing that “once the group is reinterpreted as a ‘group-within-agiven-territory,’ the difference between genocide and the crime against humanity of
extermination begins to thin dramatically.”).
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Applying these criteria, for example, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in Krstić concluded that the targeting of 40,000 Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica was a “substantial part” of the
targeted group.183 There, the Appeals Chamber found that the
Army of Republika Srpska Main Staff and Radislav Krstic
targeted the “Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, or the Bosnian
Muslims of Eastern Bosnia.”184 The size of the Bosnian Muslim
population in Srebrenica prior to its capture by the Army of
Republika Srpska forces in 1995 amounted to approximately
forty thousand people.185 While the court concluded that the
40,000 “constituted only a small percentage of the overall Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time,” it held
that “the importance of the Muslim community of Srebrenica is
not captured solely by its size.”186 The court found relevant that
Srebrenica was of “immense strategic importance to the Bosnian
Serb leadership”187 and that “Srebrenica was important due to its
prominence in the eyes of both the Bosnian Muslims and the
international community”—as a so-called “safe area.”188
In Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that
the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats of the municipalities of
the Autonomous Region of Krajina (“ARK”) constituted a substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat groups in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”).189 There, “the targeted parts
of the groups were the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats of
the ARK” and “there were 2,162,426 Bosnian Muslims and
795,745 Bosnian Croats in BiH” according to a 1991 census, and
there were “233,128 Bosnian Muslims and 63,314 Bosnian Croats
liv[ing] in the relevant . . . municipalities.”190 The Court concluded that “the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats of the . . .
municipalities of the ARK . . . constituted a substantial part, both
intrinsically and in relation to the overall Bosnian Muslim and
183. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 23
(Apr. 19, 2004).
184. Id. ¶ 15.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. ¶ 16.
189. See Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 967 (Sept. 1,
2004).
190. Id. Note that the ratios of those targeted to the larger populations approximate 1/10th.
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Bosnian Croat groups in BiH.”191
2. Factual Information Suggesting the “In Whole or In Part”
Requirement Is Satisfied
Here, the factual information suggests that the part of the
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes that was targeted satisfies the “in
part” requirement of genocide’s dolus specialis.
Initially, it is clear that individuals were targeted due to their
group membership, not as isolated individuals. This is illustrated by the ethnically charged utterances of the attackers,
which make clear that members of certain African tribes were
being targeted, not particular individuals.192
As to the requirement that the part of the group targeted be
“substantial,” this can be met in two ways. First, one might argue
that the number targeted (represented by the number killed,
200,000-400,000)193 is substantial. Using a purely numerical inquiry—the starting point suggested by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Krstić 194—the number 200,000-400,000 sounds “substantial.” Moreover, when measured as a percentage of the estimated total Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa population of
approximately six million that had been in Darfur,195 the percentage approximates 1/30th–1/15th, and the latter percentage
approximates the approximately 1/10th percentage found to
satisfy the “in part” requirement in Brd–janin.196 More importantly, the Krstić case explains that one may look at the “prominence” of the group targeted, and whether it is “emblematic of
the overall group, or is essential to its survival.”197 Here, huge
swaths of land have been de-populated of their original inhabitants198—most of the rural areas of Darfur. Thus, certainly a
191. Id.
192. See infra Part II.A.2.c.
193. See generally Reeves, supra note 1.
194. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 12
(Apr. 19, 2004) (“The numeric size of the targeted part of the group is the necessary
and important starting point, though not in all cases the ending point of the inquiry.”).
195. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 2 (estimating Darfur’s population at six million); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3.
196. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 967.
197. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 12 (“Prominence
within the group can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding
that the part qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4.”).
198. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 26.
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prominent part of the groups has been attacked. Furthermore,
given all the crimes in aggregate and conditions of displacement, certainly the survival of the groups (or at least the rural
parts of the groups), has been most distinctly threatened. Thus,
the attacks certainly have targeted a very prominent part of the
groups. Additionally, the Brd–janin case makes clear that the
targeting can be limited to a geographical zone,199 as has happened here, where the displacement is basically limited to rural
Darfur.
An alternative argument (mentioned above) would be that
the conditions of displacement have been so horrific, that those
displaced are part of the genocide. Under that analysis, the
group targeted would include the two and a half million displaced200 and the 200,000-400,000 killed, or nearly three million
(approximating one-half of the populations). This would clearly
satisfy both the numerosity and substantiality criteria. Thus,
there appear to be at least two alternative ways of showing that
the “in whole or in part” requirement has been met.
C. The Requirement of “A National, Ethnical, Racial or
Religious Group”
1. The Legal Criteria
The next requirement of the dolus specialis of genocide is
that the intent to destroy must target one of four protected
groups— a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.201 Thus,
199. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 703 (“[T]he jurisprudence of
the Tribunal supports the approach that permits a characterisation of genocide even
when the specific intent to destroy a group, in part, extends only to a limited geographical area.”); see also Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 83 (Dec. 14,
1999).
200. See generally Hoge, supra note 2.
201. As explained by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Brd–janin:
The Genocide Convention and, correspondingly, Article 4 of the Statute, protects national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. These groups are not
clearly defined in the Genocide Convention or elsewhere. The Trial Chamber
agrees with the Krstić Trial Chamber that:
The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list
was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what was recognised, before the second world war, as “national minorities,” rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of
human groups. To attempt to differentiate each of the named groups on
the basis of scientifically objective criteria would thus be inconsistent with
the object and purpose of the Convention.
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for example, destruction of political groups is not covered.202
Similarly, targeting of the cultural or sociological characteristics
of the group would not suffice,203 although, as explained above,
“attacks on cultural and religious property” “may legitimately be
considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the
group.”204
Case law states that the group should be evaluated on a
“case-by-case” basis using “objective and subjective criteria.”205
Perceived stigmatization of the group, by either the perpetrator
or the victim on the basis of “perceived national, ethnical, racial
or religious characteristics” is relevant to satisfy the subjective criterion. As the ICTY Trial Chamber in Brd–janin explained:
[T]he relevant protected group may be identified by means
of the subjective criterion of the [stigmatization] of the
group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis
of its perceived national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics. In some instances, the victim may perceive himself
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 682; see also Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No.
IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 554 (Aug. 2, 2001) (“[T]he Genocide Convention does not
protect all types of human groups. Its application is confined to national, ethnical,
racial or religious groups.”).
202. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶ 22 (Mar. 22, 2006) (“members of [those drafting the definition of genocide] declined
to include destruction of political groups within the definition of genocide.”); see also
Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 69 (Dec. 14, 1999) (“Article 4 of the Statute . . .
excludes members of political groups. The preparatory work of the [Genocide] Convention demonstrates that a wish was expressed to limit the field of application of the
Convention to protecting ‘stable’ groups objectively defined and to which individuals
belong regardless of their own desires.”).
203. See Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 25 (“[A]n enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in
order to annihilate these elements which give to that group its own identity distinct
from the rest of the community would not fall under the definition of genocide.”).
204. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580.
205. See, e.g., Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 25 (suggesting the application of both subjective and objective criteria); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi,
Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgment, ¶ 484 (Sept. 12, 2006) (as to the criteria for
determining protected groups, “Trial Chambers have tended to decide the matter on a
case-by-case basis, taking into consideration both the objective and subjective particulars”); Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 667 (Jan. 17,
2005) (“The Trial Chamber finds that the correct determination of the relevant protected group has to be made on a case-by-case basis, consulting both objective and subjective criteria.”); Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 684. (“The correct determination of the relevant protected group has to be made on a case-by-case basis, consulting both objective and subjective criteria.”).
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or herself to belong to the aforesaid group.206

However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified that “a subjective
definition alone is not enough to determine victim groups.”207
There are ICTY Trial Chamber decisions suggesting that
“where more than one group is targeted, the elements of the
crime of genocide must be considered in relation to each group
separately.”208 However, the Appeals Chamber more recently
clarified that while “each individual group which makes up the
aggregate group” must be “a positively defined target group,” after that, “more than one protected group may be aggregated
into a larger ‘negative’ group [e.g., non-Arabs] for the purposes
of protection under the [genocide statute].”209
An ethnic group typically has been defined “as a group
whose members share a common language or culture,”210 although those criteria are not always applied strictly.211
206. As explained in Brd–janin:
Although the objective determination of a religious group still remains possible . . . it is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or
racial group from the point of view of those persons who wish to single that
group out from the rest of the community. The Trial Chamber . . . elects to
evaluate membership in a national, ethnical or racial group using a subjective
criterion. It is the stigmatisation of a group as a distinct national, ethnical or
racial unit by the community which allows it to be determined whether a
targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group in the eyes
of the alleged perpetrators.
Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 683; see also Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, ¶ 70.
207. See Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 25.
208. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 686; see also Stakić, Case No. IT-9724-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (“[A] targeted group may be distinguishable on more than one
basis and the elements of genocide must be considered in relation to each group separately, e.g. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.”).
209. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 27. The Appeals
Chamber held that the Trial Chamber “did not err in concluding that the elements of
genocide must be separately considered in relation to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats.” Id. ¶ 28. In that case, “there was insufficient evidence to show that the Bosnian
Croats were a targeted group.” Id. ¶ 29. Here, by contrast, if one were to look at the
targeting of Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa separately, it is clear that each group is being
targeted.
210. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Sept. 2,
1998).
211. See Schabas, supra note 4, at 1713 (“Whether the Tutsi were in fact ethnically
distinct from the Hutu, in an objective sense, is a question that has been set aside because the racist extremists who perpetrated the genocide saw them as being ethnically
distinct.”); see also Luban, supra note 4, at 318 (“The evolving case law has moved from
defining ethnicity by objective characteristics such as shared language and culture to
subjective self-identification (we Tutsis are an ethnic group if we think of ourselves as
one)—and, crucially, to identification as an ethnic group by others, namely the perse-
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2. Factual Information Suggesting the Targeting of
Ethnic Groups
Here, the facts suggest that the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa
(as well as other smaller African tribes under attack) are “ethnic”
groups that are distinct from the Arab Janjaweed attackers. The
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa each have a distinct language and culture.212
Members of these groups also self-identified themselves as
distinct from the Janjaweed attackers.213 For example, a twentyseven-year-old farmer called Feisal, when asked how he recognized the Janjaweed stated: “It is their color, their language and
their clothes. They are not as we are.”214 Similarly, a man interviewed said: “They killed everything black—guns or no guns,
cattle or no cattle. This is the program: they don’t want African
tribes in this place.”215 Adam, a thirty-two-year-old farmer
burned out of Gokar village near Geneina, said a Janjaweed
leader in Geneina, Omda Saef, told local people: “This place is
for Arabs, not Africans.”216 As mentioned above, numerous atcutors.”); Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 1117, 1119, 1121-22 (“whether or not there is an
‘objective’ distinction between victim and perpetrator groups in Darfur is increasingly
irrelevant from the perspective of” international criminal law; the Hutu and Tutsi speak
the same language, share the same culture and religion, live in the same places, and are
in no sense tribes or distinct ethnic groups, yet ICTR case law has concluded they
should be considered as separate ethnic groups because they perceived themselves as
such (citing testimony of Alison DesForges of Human Rights Watch)).
212. Human Rights Watch describes the targeted communities as “sharing the
ethnicity of or geographic proximity to the two main rebel movements.” ENTRENCHING
IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 6-7 (emphasis added). There are apparently “many different ethnic groups in Darfur with their own languages and customs”—the three main
ethnic groups being the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit, all of which are considered nonArab. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3.
213. Indeed, on this basis, the U.N.’s Commission of Inquiry concluded that this
element of genocide was present—there was a “protected group being targeted.” Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, ¶ 640. It found: “Recent developments have led members of African and Arab tribes to perceive themselves and others as two distinct ethnic
groups. . . . The tribes in Darfur supporting rebels have increasingly come to be identified as ‘African’ and those supporting the Government as ‘Arabs.’ ” Id. The Commission did not reach the nuance that there are in fact at least three African ethnic groups
being targeted.
214. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 36.
215. Id. at 27 (citing a Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammed in Chad
on Apr. 13, 2004).
216. Id. at 42 (emphasis added) (citing a Human Rights Watch interview with
Adam in Chad on Apr. 2, 2004).
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tackers have referred to those being attacked as “Nuba”217—a
derogatory term used to refer to ethnic Africans.218
Although an over-simplification,219 the conflict largely
breaks down along Arab and non-Arab lines. The African
groups (called “Zurga”) are defined by the facts that they do not
speak Arabic as their native language and that they are farmers
(with the exception of the Zaghawa, who are nomadic).220 Accordingly, the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa appear to be distinct
“ethnic groups” when compared to their Janjaweed attackers,
and, in large part, are distinct from the Government of Sudan.221
D. The Requirement of “As Such”
1. The Legal Criteria
The final legal requirement regarding the dolus specialis of
the crime of genocide is that the national, ethnical, racial or religious group be targeted “as such.” That is, “[t]he victims of the
crime must be targeted because of their membership in the protected group.”222 As the Appeals Chamber in Stakić explained:
“the words ‘as such’ . . . focus[ ] on the destruction of groups,
217. See supra Part II.A.2.
218. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at n.29; see also ENTRENCHED IMPUNITY,
supra note 10, at n.35.
219. There are members of the Sudanese armed forces who come from the groups
under attack. This is thought to explain why the Sudanese Government has in large
part used Janjaweed forces as a proxy to conduct the attacks, given the concern that
members of the Sudanese armed forces who were Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa might not
attack fellow group members. See, e.g., ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that many of the armed forces were from Darfur and, for that reason, the Sudanese
government utilized the Janjaweed as the main ground forces). In another exception
to the rule that the Arabs are attacking the African tribes, Ja’afar Abdul El Hakh, provincial commissioner of Garsila from 2003 through March 2004, who had a role in the
March 2004 executions at Garsila and Deleig, is himself Fur. See id. at 33. “There are
also many larger Arab tribes in Darfur who have their own homelands or dars, and have
not participated in the conflict.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3.
220. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR IN FLAMES: ATROCITIES IN WESTERN SUDAN
6 (2004), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/sudan0404.pdf. While
there has been destruction that appears to be “religious” in form, because both the
African tribes and Janjaweed are Muslim, this Article does not suggest there is a particularly religious motivation to the attacks. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 28.
221. There are also smaller African and Arab ethnic groups in Darfur who are not
direct participants in the conflict. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at n.1. Thus,
the Article does not intend to suggest that all Arab and African groups in Darfur are
part of the conflict.
222. Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 669 (Jan.
17, 2005).
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not individuals;”223 the words show “that the offence requires intent to destroy a collection of people who have a particular
group identity.”224 Thus, for example, the Trial Chamber in
Krstić explained:
[T]he victims of genocide must be targeted by reason of their
membership in a group . . . . The intent to destroy a group as
such, in whole or in part, presupposes that the victims were
chosen by reason of their membership in the group whose
destruction was sought.
Mere knowledge of the victims’
membership in a distinct group on the part of the perpetrators is not sufficient to establish an intention to destroy the
group as such.225

Thus, the group per se must be targeted, not specific individuals.226 As the Trial Chamber in Jelisić explained:
“[T]he intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such,’
223. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 24
(Mar. 22, 2006).
224. Id. ¶ 20.
225. Prosecutor v. Krstić , Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 561 (Aug. 2, 2001). As
stated by the Appeals Chamber in Stakić:
The group must be targeted because of characteristics peculiar to it, and the
specific intent must be to destroy the group as a separate and distinct entity.
As the Trial Chamber in Sikirica pointed out: “Whereas it is the individuals
that constitute the victims of most crimes, the ultimate victim of genocide is
the group, although its destruction necessarily requires the commission of
crimes against its members, that is, against individuals belonging to that
group.”
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 521. Similarly, the Trial
Chamber in Jelisić explained:
The special intent which [characterizes] genocide supposes that the alleged
perpetrator of the crime selects his victims because they are part of a group
which he is seeking to destroy. Where the goal of the perpetrator or perpetrators of the crime is to destroy all or part of a group, it is the “membership of
the individual in a particular group rather than the identity of the individual
that is the decisive criterion in determining the immediate victims of the
crime of genocide.”
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 67 (Dec. 14, 1999).
226. The trial chamber in Sikirica explained:
The evidence must establish that it is the group that has been targeted, and
not merely specific individuals within that group. That is the significance of
the phrase “as such” in the chapeau. Whereas it is the individuals that constitute the victims of most crimes, the ultimate victim of genocide is the group,
although its destruction necessarily requires the commission of crimes against
its members, that is, against individuals belonging to that group.
Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on defense motions to acquit,
¶ 89 (Sept. 3, 2001); see also Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 551 (“[G]enocide
must target not only one or several individuals but a group as such.”).
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meaning as a separate and distinct entity, and not merely
some individuals because of their membership in a particular
group.” By killing an individual member of the targeted
group, the perpetrator does not thereby only manifest his hatred of the group to which his victim belongs but also knowingly commits this act as part of a wider-ranging intention to
destroy the national, ethnical, racial or religious group of
which the victim is a member.227

2. Factual Information Suggesting “As Such” Is Satisfied
Here, it is quite clear that the group members—the Fur,
Masalit and Zaghawa—are being targeted because of their group
membership (as African tribes), not as specific individuals. As
victims have stated: “They killed everything black . . . they don’t
want African tribes in this place.”228 Another witness described
the motives of the attackers: “All this is because we are black.”229
Accordingly, it appears clear that all four elements of genocide’s dolus specialis have been met in the situation of Darfur.
E. Examination of Potential Weaknesses as to “Intent to Destroy”
While so much factual information suggests that there is “intent to destroy” in the situation of Darfur, because credible
sources have suggested that the bulk of the killing is not necessarily genocide,230 it is useful to examine what may be potential
weaknesses in the above positions in order to understand some
of the hesitance. Below, we examine two arguments: (a) that
the situation is more prominently about displacement than outright killing, and the extensive displacement negates “intent to
destroy”; and (b) that there are political or other motivations
(such as obtaining natural resources) for the killing, and these
other motivations negate “intent to destroy.” The first argument
is rebuttable and the second one is incorrect as a matter of
227. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 79.
228. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 27.
229. Id. at 30. For further discussion of motives, see infra Part II.E.2.
230. It is important to note that neither Human Rights Watch nor the U.N.’s Commission of Inquiry found that the situation was not genocide. The U.N. Commission
clearly left open the possibility that some acts of genocide might be occurring when it
stated “in some instances, individuals, including Government officials” may have committed “acts with genocidal intent.” Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, ¶ 641; see also
Luban, supra note 4, at 303-04 (lamenting the news coverage of the Commission’s findings, which misstates the findings as determining that no genocide occurred).
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law.231
1. The Argument That the Situation Primarily Concerns
Displacement
One potential argument against there being “intent to destroy” is that the displacement has been so extensive (2.5 million)232 compared to the killing (200,000-400,000)233 that the
predominant crime is displacement, not killing.234 The argument would be that the fact that so many were displaced and not
killed—when more could have been killed outright—negates
“intent to destroy.” This argument would be bolstered, for ex231. Additional reasons why the U.N. Commission of Inquiry determined that
genocidal intent was lacking, at least on the part of the Government of Sudan, were:
(a) that young males were killed, not entire village populations; (b) because villages
containing both Africans and Arab tribes were not attacked; (c) and because on one
occasion a person who did not resist having his camels stolen was spared, while his
brother who resisted was killed. Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, ¶¶ 513, 516, 517.
These arguments are unpersuasive. First, factually, not only young males have been
killed. See infra Part II.F.1. Furthermore, as explained above, the Krstić case found that
the killing of military-age men was consistent with genocidal intent. See Prosecutor v.
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 26-27 (Apr. 19, 2004); see
also Mathew, supra note 7, at 540-42 (explaining why the U.N.’s conclusion was inconsistent with the Krstić case). Second, the fact that villages containing both Africans and
Arab tribes were not attacked could in fact bolster the conclusion that only Africans
were being targeted—the attackers “are hostile only to the targeted group, and don’t
want to risk damage to other groups.” Luban, supra note 4, at 315. Third, the fact that
a man who gave up his camels was spared while his brother, who would not, was killed,
hardly negates genocidal intent. It might indicate that that camel-thief lacked genocidal intent. Id. at 315. Moreover, the ICTY in the Jelisić case found that random acts of
mercy did not negate genocidal intent. See Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A,
Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 71 (July 5, 2001); Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 1130-31
(invoking Jelisić to explain errors in the Commission’s conclusions: “the fact that not
every potential victim was killed or abused should not be a bar to a finding of genocide”); see also Luban, supra note 4, at 315 (criticizing the Commission’s conclusion:
“the fact that Adolf Eichmann at one point allowed a trainload of Hungarian Jews to
escape to safety in return for money is [no] ‘evidence’ that the Holocaust was not a
genocide”).
232. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
234. The U.N. Commission of Experts suggested this argument when it found that
because survivors were not killed but forced into camps, that negated genocidal intent:
Another element that tends to show the Sudanese Government’s lack of genocidal intent can be seen in the fact that persons forcibly dislodged from their
villages are collected in IDP [Internally Displaced Persons] camps. In other
words, the populations surviving attacks on villages are not killed outright, so
as to eradicate the group; they are rather forced to abandon their homes and
live together in areas selected by the Government.
Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, ¶ 515.
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ample, by the ICTY’s Stakić decision, discussed above, which
found that the killing in a certain “camp” in Bosnia-Herzegovina
was not genocide, because so many more individuals passed in
transit through the camp (approximately 27,000) than were
killed in Prejidor (approximately 3000).235
The potential responses to this would be several. First, one
should not extrapolate from the fact that people were successful
in fleeing that there was not originally intent to destroy large
numbers. Genocide is largely a crime of “intent,” so what happens on the ground is less significant than actual intentions.236
Second, one might argue that the conditions of displacement, as
discussed above, were so horrific that it was basically international humanitarian assistance that kept large numbers of Fur,
Masalit and Zaghawa alive in camps, not the Government of Sudan, so that the displacement is part of the genocide.237 In fact,
as shown below, the displacement, in the situations that existed
in Darfur, constitutes the underlying crime of “inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy the group in whole or in
part.”238 Third, one could argue that based on the ICTY’s Krstić
235. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 553 (July 31, 2003),
aff’d, Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 42 (Mar.
22, 2006) (“the fact that more Bosnian Muslims could have been killed, but were not,
indicates that the Appellant lacked dolus specialis.”).
236. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 522 (“The key factor is the specific
intent to destroy the group rather than its actual physical destruction . . . . It is the
genocidal dolus specialis that predominantly constitutes the crime.”).
237. The Commission of Inquiry concluded that “the living conditions in those
camps . . . do not seem to be calculated to bring about the extinction of the ethnic
group to which the IDPs belong,” because “the Government of Sudan generally allows
humanitarian organizations to help the population in camps by providing food, clean
water, medicines and logistical assistance.” Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, ¶ 515.
In fact, the death rate at the camps is quite high, with mortality rates similar to famine
conditions. See Reeves, supra note 6. There has also been evidence of the Government
of Sudan impeding humanitarian assistance. See Reeves, supra note 6 (“a number of
camps have indeed been extermination sites at some point in their history”); see also
infra Part II.F.2. Reeves notes that conditions in camps vary considerably, but that some
are akin to “concentration camps,” such as the Kailek camp south of Kass in South
Darfur. Eric Reeves, African Auschwitz: The Concentration Camps of Darfur; The UN and the
International Community Are Acquiescing in Genocide, SUDANREEVES.ORG, May 12, 2004,
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article191-pl.html. The U.N. suggested conditions at Kailek showed “a strategy of systematic and deliberate starvation being enforced
by the [Government of Sudan] and its security forces.” Jim Lobe, Pressure for Intervention
in Darfur Grows, ONEWORLD US, June 16, 2004, http://us.oneworld.net/article/view/
88343/1/.
238. See infra Part II.F.3. Beth Van Schaack, for example, argues that the U.N.
Commission erred in not fully appreciating the deleterious effects of such conditions:
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decision, which found that transfer of the women and children
was “an additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction of the Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica,”239
transfer of part of the population has been recognized not to
negate genocidal intent.240 Finally, one could distinguish Stakić
because there the Trial Chamber looked at the 3000 deaths to
conclude that the group was not targeted in “substantial
part”241—not to suggest that the definition of genocide requires
the whole group to be killed (which it clearly does not, since it
protects groups “in whole or in part”). Here, by contrast, where
200,000-400,000 have been killed, the “in part” analysis is far
stronger.242 Furthermore, in Stakić, the Trial Chamber also concluded that the accused “merely intended to displace, but not to
destroy, the Bosnian Muslim group.”243 Here, by contrast, there
are very strong indicators of intent to destroy at least substantial
parts of the protected groups.244

[B]y focusing only on how many individuals were killed, as opposed to the
number of persons subjected to other genocidal acts enumerated in the Convention, the Report [by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry] does not fully appreciate the range of genocidal acts encompassed by the Convention and thus
disregards the notion of non-killing genocide. The Genocide Convention purposefully reaches acts that fall short of murder but that will lead to the destruction of a group. . . . Implementing such a policy in Sudan would enable the
government to blame any subsequent deaths on the harsh Sudanese conditions or external factors such as famine and deflect attention away from a program of extermination.
Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 1131-32.
239. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 31
(Apr. 19, 2004). The Krstić decision also suggested that the decision to displace the
women and children rather than killing them might have been explained “by the Bosnian Serbs’ sensitivity to public opinion.” Id. In other words, the international outcry
would have been far more strenuous had women and children been executed. Here, of
course, similar logic could be employed: placing people in camps rather than killing
them outright avoids more strenuous international condemnation. See Luban, supra
note 4, at 314 (making this argument, and concluding: “the similarity with Srebrenica
is striking, but the ICTY and the U.N. Commission reach opposite conclusions on remarkably similar evidence”).
240. See Mathew, supra note 7, at 542-43.
241. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 42 (explaining
Trial Chamber’s reasoning).
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. See Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 56 (construing
Trial Chamber).
244. See supra Part II.A.
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2. The Argument That There Are Other Motivations at Issue
Which Negate Intent to Destroy
Another argument that has been made is that the attackers
were not motivated by intent to destroy the groups per se, but
based on other reasons. This appears to be the key reason why
the U.N.’s Commission of Inquiry concluded that, at least on the
part of the central Government, genocidal intent was lacking:
The crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are
concerned. Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing
and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not
evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a
group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious
grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from
their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.245

A more expansive argument would be, for example, that the
Government’s motivations were to control the counter-insurgency, punish the ethnic groups from which the counter-insurgency sprang, and prevent a political solution that would have
provided the African tribes in Darfur with political rights. The
argument could be, regarding the Janjaweed, that they, by contrast, had no such political motivations, but were content to be
the proxy-fighting force for the Government of Sudan because
they were paid salaries by the Government of Sudan,246 receive
cattle, and received land and access to water once the African
tribes were removed.
The response to these arguments is that they confuse intent
and motive. As explained above, the law is clear that in examining genocidal intent, the focus is whether there is intent to destroy, not why there is intent to destroy (or motive).247 Even the
245. Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, ¶ 640 (emphasis added).
246. See, e.g., DARFUR DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 1 (Janjaweed were “supplied
with arms, communications equipment, salaries and uniforms by government officials”)
(emphasis added).
247. The Appeals Chamber in Jelisić noted the “irrelevance” of motives in criminal
law and highlighted:
[T]he necessity to distinguish specific intent from motive. The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain
personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power.
The existence of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from
also having the specific intent to commit genocide.
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U.N. Commission recognized this distinction.248 Both the
ICTR’s Media decision249 and the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal decision250 apply just that distinction, explaining that a political
motivation (of the Hutu and then-Iraqi regime, respectively) did
not negate genocidal intent (in targeting the Tutsi and Kurds of
Northern Iraq, respectively).
Thus, in the ICTR’s Media decision, the Trial Chamber explained that the fact that the Hutu had a “political agenda” did
not negate genocidal intent:
Based on the evidence set forth above, the Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Ferdinand Nahimana, JeanBosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze acted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group. The Chamber
considers that the association of the Tutsi ethnic group with a political agenda, effectively merging ethnic and political identity, does not
negate the genocidal animus that motivated the Accused. To the
contrary, the identification of Tutsi individuals as enemies of
the state associated with political opposition, simply by virtue
of their Tutsi ethnicity, underscores the fact that their membership in the ethnic group, as such, was the sole basis on
which they were targeted.251

A similar conclusion was recently reached by the Trial
Chamber judges of the Iraqi High Tribunal (a national tribunal
sitting in Baghdad) in concluding that genocide had been committed against the Iraqi Kurds when they were subjected in 1988
to chemical weapons attacks and other crimes as part of the
“Anfal campaign” under Saddam Hussein’s regime.252 The Trial
Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 49 (July 5,
2001); see also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶
(Mar. 22, 2006) (“[T]he Tribunal’s jurisprudence distinguishes between motive and
intent; in genocide cases, the reason why the accused sought to destroy the victim
group has no bearing on guilt.”).
248. See Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, ¶ 493 (“From the viewpoint of criminal
law, what matters is not the motive, but rather whether or not there exists the requisite
special intent to destroy a group.”).
249. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 969 (Dec. 3, 2003).
250. Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. 1/C Second 2006, Iraqi High Tribunal (English Translation) (June 24, 2007).
251. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 969 (emphasis
added); see also Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Judgment, ¶ 412 (Dec. 13,
2005) (“The perpetrator need not be solely motivated by a criminal intent to commit
genocide.”).
252. As part of the “Anfal campaign,” the Tribunal found that more than 3000
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Chamber stated: “It is important to mention that the relation
between ethnic group and political program, which practically
merge between ethnic and political identifies, does not [negate]
the intention of genocide . . . .”253 In other words, where a protected ethnic group was being targeted (the Kurds of Northern
Iraq), the fact that there was also a political motivation for the
targeting did not negate “intent to destroy.”254
That this is the correct legal result is reinforced by examining additional cases where courts found that genocide occurred,
but there were clearly varying motives. For example, in the former Yugoslavia, some of the killing—such as the Srebrenica massacre—has been held by the ICTY to constitute genocide.255 Yet,
if one examines the motivations at issue, it is clear that the Bosnian-Serb political and military leadership did not target Bosnian-Muslims out of some “purety” of ethnic hatred, but because
they wanted to control the land that Srebrenica was on, thereby
connecting two land areas under Republic Srpska control, and
strengthening Serb power (all political motivations).256 Simivillages were destroyed and that there were at least “tens of thousands of victims,” with
some fatality estimates as high as 182,000. Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. 1/
C Second 2006, at 501.
253. Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. 1/C Second 2006, at 629 (citing
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 969).
254. The Tribunal concluded that the Kurds “were targeted by [the] former
[Ba’ath] regime and Saddam Hussein for their ethnicity and nationalism.” Anfal Trial
Chamber Judgment, Case No. 1/C Second 2006, at 630, 634.
255. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 95-97 (Apr. 19, 2004).
256. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber explained in Krstić:
Srebrenica (and the surrounding Central Podrinje region) were of immense
strategic importance to the Bosnian Serb leadership. Without Srebrenica, the
ethnically Serb state of Republica Srpska they sought to create would remain
divided into two disconnected parts, and its access to Serbia proper would be
disrupted. The capture and ethnic purification of Srebrenica would therefore
severely undermine the military efforts of the Bosnian Muslim state to ensure
its viability, a consequence the Muslim leadership fully realized and strove to
prevent. Control over the Srebrenica region was consequently essential to the
goal of some Bosnian Serb leaders of forming a viable political entity in Bosnia.
Id. ¶ 15. Proving the U.N. impotent to protect its “safe area” and the Bosnian Muslims
may also have been a motivation. As the Appeals Chamber further explained:
In addition, Srebrenica was important due to its prominence in the eyes of
both the Bosnian Muslims and the international community. The town of
Srebrenica was the most visible of the “safe areas” established by the U.N. Security Council in Bosnia. By 1995 it had received significant attention in the
international media. In its resolution declaring Srebrenica a safe area, the
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larly, the killing in Rwanda has been deemed genocide in many
decisions of the ICTR. There again, there may have been a great
amount of ethnic hatred per se, but the killing was largely motivated by a Hutu grab to consolidate political power and win the
ongoing war against the Tutsi.257 Yet, these underlying motivations are never suggested to negate genocidal intent. Similarly,
if the Genocide Convention had existed at the time of World
War II,258 we would not inquire why the Nazi Government determined to exterminate the Jewish people of Germany and the occupied territories (their political motivations); rather, the fact
that they set out to exterminate a substantial part of the Jewish
people would suffice to constitute genocide. Accordingly, it
does not matter that the Government of Sudan may have had
political and/or military motivations in launching its campaign
against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa—the law is clear, such
motivations do not negate genocidal intent.259
Thus, the two most serious potential arguments as to why
Security Council announced that it “should be free from armed attack or any
other hostile act.” This guarantee of protection was re-affirmed by the commander of the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia (“UNPROFOR”) and reinforced with the deployment of U.N. troops. The elimination of the Muslim
population of Srebrenica, despite the assurances given by the international
community, would serve as a potent example to all Bosnian Muslims of their
vulnerability and defenselessness in the face of Serb military forces.
Id. ¶ 16; see also SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 248-49 (2002) (explaining that the violence against Croats and Muslims was
motivated by a desire to establish Republika Srpska).
257. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 2
(1999) (“The [Hutu] believed that the extermination campaign would restore the solidarity of the Hutu under their leadership and help them win the war [against the Tutsi
armed forces—the Rwandan Patriotic Front], or at least improve their chances of negotiating a favorable peace.”).
258. The Genocide Convention dates from 1948 and its creation is largely a response to the Holocaust. Genocide Convention, supra note 12.
259. See Reeves, supra note 7 (arguing that the U.N. Commission confused motive
and intent in a “fundamental” “intellectual failing” which “vitiate[s] any conclusion deriving from this line of reasoning”). As another author has explained, it would be a
mistake to characterize the conflict in Darfur as one not about ethnic conflict but resources, even though the Janjaweed may have been motivated by the ability to gain:
[L]oot and access . . . [to] fertile land and water resources. . . . In international law, however, motive is distinguishable from intent. Even though the
perpetrators may have been motivated by economic gain, that motive does not
necessarily negate the simultaneous existence of genocidal intent. A genocidist may possess both financial motive and the requisite intent for genocide.
Mathew, supra note 7, at 539.
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genocidal intent might be lacking are either rebuttable or incorrect as a matter of law.
F. The Underlying Crimes
Finally, as mentioned above, in addition to the dolus specialis
or special intent for genocide, it is necessary to show one or
more of the following underlying crimes:
(a)
Killing members of the group;
(b)
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
(d)
the group;
(e)
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.260

Here, the facts clearly show that at least the first three crimes
have been committed.261
1. Killing Members of the Group
For “killing”262 to suffice as an underlying crime, it must be
killing of members of the protected group.263 Whereas the focus
of the dolus specialis is the intention to commit genocide,264 regarding the underlying crimes, “proof of a result” is required.265
The mens rea for killing requires intent, but not necessarily pre260. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 40, art. 6.
261. Indeed, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry also reached this conclusion that
“the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely [sic] to bring about physical destruction,” had
occurred. Commission of Inquiry, supra note 7, at ¶ 640.
262. See Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 642
(Jan. 17, 2005) (“In the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, the term ‘killings’ referred to
under Article 4(2)(a) has been equated with murder.”).
263. See Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 689 (Sept. 1,
2004) (“The killing must be of members of the targeted national, ethnical, racial or
religious group.”).
264. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 522 (July 31,
2004) (“The key factor is the specific intent to destroy the group rather than its actual
physical destruction.”).
265. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (“The acts in subparagraphs
(a) and (b) of Article 4(2) require proof of a result.”).

\\server05\productn\F\FIN\31-4\FIN407.txt

1042

unknown

Seq: 53

12-MAY-08

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

16:38

[Vol. 31:990

meditation.266
Here, the facts suggest there has been extensive killing of
members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes:
• There are numerous accounts of bombardment of villages
of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa African tribes by the Sudanese Air Force.267
• Subsequent to bombardment, the Janjaweed move in on
horseback, followed by the army in cars, and start killing. For
example, in the words of one witness:
“The army was in Land Cruisers and the Janjaweed on
horses and camels . . . . The Janjaweed entered the village first, followed by the cars. They were shooting indiscriminately. They went into tukls [huts] and killed people who were hiding under their beds.”268
The following killings—which are believed to be typical of a
broader pattern—were documented:
• Mororo village, close to the Masalit-Fur border: 40
dead;269
• The Murnei area, twelve villages: 82 dead;270
• Mango,
killed;271

in the

Terbeba-Arara area:

at least 20

• Urum, near Habila: 112 killed in two attacks;272
• The Bareh area, east of Geneina: 111 killed;273
• Habila Canare, twenty-five kilometers east of El
Geneina: 50 killed;274
• Kondoli, in the Misterei area: 24 killed;275
• Nouri, near Murnei: 136 killed;276
266. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 515 (“As regards the underlying acts,
the word ‘killing’ is understood to refer to intentional but not necessarily premeditated
acts.”).
267. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 24-25 (discussing aerial bombardment
of civilians).
268. Id. at 16 (quoting a Human Rights Watch interview with Feisal in Chad on
Apr. 5, 2004).
269. Id. at 9.
270. Id. at 10.
271. Id. at 11.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 12.
274. Id. at 13.
275. Id. at 14.
276. Id. at 15.
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• Kenyu, near Forbranga: 57 killed;277
• Sildi, south-east of Geneina: 12 killed;278
• Tunfuka, south of Murnei: 26 killed;279
• Tullus: at least 27 killed;280
• Terbeba: 26 killed;281
• Millebeeda village and area, south-west of Geneina: 59
civilians killed.282
• There are instances of mass executions by the Janjaweed,
such as at Wadi Salih, where several hundred men were executed over a few days in early March 2004.283 According to
testimony taken in Chad:
A survivor of one of the mass killings, a farmer who was
shot in the back rather than the neck, told a neighbor
that the arrested men were taken, in army trucks and
cars, to a valley a few miles south of Deleig. “Then they
lined us up, made us kneel down and bend our heads—
and shot us from behind,” he told a neighbor. “I was left
for dead . . . .” The executioners were army soldiers and
Janjaweed, operating together.284
• Children and elderly are among those killed285 (making it
277. Id. at 16.
278. Id. at 17.
279. Id. at 18.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 20.
282. Id. at 21; see also id. at Appendix D (massacre and mass killing victims, by
village).
283. ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 26-28.
284. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 22 (citing Human Rights Interview in
Chad on Apr. 14, 2004). Ja’afar Abdul El Hakh, provincial commissioner of Garsila
from 2003 through March 2004, appears to have had a direct role in planning and
coordinating March 2004 mass executions in Deleig and Garsila, and distributing weapons to the Janjaweed. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 28-33. He was later
promoted to governor of West Darfur. Id. at 55.
285. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 12 (three-year-old orphaned grandson of
an imam killed); id. at 13 (a one hundred-year-old man, Barra Younis, from Terchana,
was “burned . . . alive in his hut”); id. (helicopter pilot killed a woman–-seventy-year-old
Mariam Abdul Qadar–-in the Bareh area, east of Geneina); id. at 17 (as to Kenyu, near
Fobranga: “So many children were killed”); id. at 24 (child and old woman burned to
death in her house in Kundung by the Janjaweed); id. at 31 (seven year old killed in
Kudumule, outside Misterei); ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 51 (An elderly
Zaghawa woman who lived in Marla said: “Many people and children were killed during that attack [on Marla, December 15-16, 2004] and in front of us, but we had to leave
their bodies unburied and run.”) (quoting Human Rights Watch interview with Internally displaced person from Marla, February 2005); id. (children were killed, some
while fleeing the school in Hamada, January 13-14, 2005).
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clear that not solely military-age men have been targeted, although men have probably been the predominant targets);286
• There are also instances where severely ill or wounded villagers were denied access to larger towns with hospitals and
health care.287 For example, a witness from a village approximately fifteen km from Garsila said his child “died after he
was forced to wait six days for a Janjaweed escort before taking the child to a health center in Garsila.”288 Wounded and
villagers were also detained in Adway without being able to
seek medical care after men were summarily executed and
women raped by government soldiers and Janjaweed.289

Thus, it seems quite clear that the crime of intentionally killing
protected group members has occurred.
2. Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to
Members of the Group
As to the underlying crime of causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group, the ICTY Trial Chamber
in Krstić explained that the “actus reus is an intentional act or
omission causing serious bodily or mental suffering.”290 “The
[ICTR] Trial Chamber in the Kayishema & Ruzindana case found
that bodily harm refers to harm that seriously injures the health,
causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external,
internal organs or senses.”291
Case law specifies that “the harm need not be permanent or
irremediable, but ‘[i]t must be harm that results in a grave and
long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and
constructive life.’ ”292 Put another way, “[t]he harm inflicted
need not be permanent and irremediable, but needs to be serious.”293 Mental harm thus “refers to more than minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties.”294 Whether an act consti286. For instance, at Wadi Salih, the men were purposefully singled out and executed. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 21-23. This also occured in the valley
south of Deleig. Id. at 22.
287. Id. at 35.
288. Id. at 39 (citing Human Rights Watch interview in Darfur on Apr. 2004).
289. See generally ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10.
290. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Aug. 2, 2001).
291. Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645 (Jan. 7, 2005).
292. Id.
293. Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 690 (Sept. 1, 2004);
see also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 516 (July 31, 2003).
294. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645 (invoking the Semanza Trial
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tutes “serious bodily or mental harm . . . must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis, with due regard for the particular circumstances of the case.”295
Acts that have been recognized to constitute “serious bodily
or mental harm” include: torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined
with beatings, threats of death, deportation,296 and “harm that
damages health or causes disfigurement or serious injury.”297
The ICTR has recognized the refusal to allow refugees to obtain
food as causing “serious bodily or mental harm.”298 As with killing, proof of a result is required—the act must occur, not just be
intended.299 As to the mens rea, “the harm must be inflicted
intentionally.”300
Thus, for example, trauma and wounds suffered by individuals who survived the Srebrenica mass executions constituted
“serious bodily and mental harm.”301 An ICTY Trial Chamber in
Judgment decision); see also Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (“[S]erious
harm need not cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that
goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harm
that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal
and constructive life.”).
295. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 646.
296. Id. (listing “torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined with beatings, threats of death, and deportation”);
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (listing “inhuman treatment, torture, rape,
sexual abuse and deportation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily or
mental injury”). The Trial Chamber in Blagojević recognized that deportation was included:
In particular, the Krstić Trial Chamber held that “inhuman treatment [. . .]
and deportation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily or mental
injury.” It found support for this in the case law of this Tribunal as well as in
other sources. The Eichmann Judgement rendered by the Jerusalem District
Court on 12 December 1961 had already included “deportation” among the
acts that could constitute serious bodily or mental harm.
Blagojević Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 646.
297. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 690 (listing “torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined
with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes disfigurement
or serious injury to members of the targeted national, ethnical, racial or religious
group”); see also Stakić, Case No IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 516.
298. See Prosecutor v. Seromba, Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Judgment, ¶ 330 (Dec.
13, 2006).
299. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (“The acts in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 4(2) require proof of a result.”).
300. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645; Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36T, Judgment, ¶ 690.
301. See Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 647-49.
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Blagojević & Jokić explained: “The fear of being captured, and,
at the moment of the separation, the sense of utter helplessness
and extreme fear for their family and friends’ safety as well as for
their own safety, is a traumatic experience from which one will
not quickly–-if ever-–recover.”302 The forced displacement of
women, children and elderly from Srebrenica was held to be a
“traumatic experience” which caused “serious mental harm.”303
The Trial Chamber also considered, inter alia, that there was not
“adequate supplies of food, medicine or even water for the
thousands of Bosnian Muslims” displaced.304
Here, there are numerous crimes that would constitute “serious bodily or mental harm”:
• Torture: “Government forces . . . regularly arbitrarily detained and sometimes tortured Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit students, political activists, and other individuals in Darfur and
Khartoum.”305 In one case of torture reported from the Garsila area, a Fur man was detained and whipped until all the
skin was flayed from his back; holes were then gouged out of
302. Id. ¶ 647. The Trial Chamber continued:
The Trial Chamber finds that the men suffered mental harm having their
identification documents taken away from them, seeing that they would not be
exchanged as previously told, and when they understood what their ultimate
fate was. Upon arrival at an execution site, they saw the killing fields covered
of bodies of the Bosnian Muslim men brought to the execution site before
them and murdered. After having witnessed the executions of relatives and
friends, and in some cases suffering from injuries themselves, they suffered the
further mental anguish of lying still, in fear, under the bodies—sometimes of
relative or friends—for long hours, listening to the sounds of the executions,
of the moans of those suffering in pain, and then of the machines as mass
graves were dug.
Id. ¶ 647.
303. See id. ¶¶ 650, 652-54. For example, the Trial Chamber held that:
The Trial Chamber has no doubt that the suffering of the women, children
and elderly people who were cruelly separated from their loved and forcibly
transferred, and the terrible consequences that this had on their life, reaches
the threshold of serious mental harm under Article 4(2)(b) of the Statute.
The Trial Chamber also finds that the level of mental anguish suffered by the
women, children and elderly people who were forcibly displaced from their
homes—in such a manner as to [traumatize] them and prevent them from
ever returning—obliged to abandon their property and their belongings as
well as their traditions and more in general their relationship with the territory they were living on, does constitute serious mental harm.
Id. ¶ 652.
304. Id. ¶ 650.
305. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 7.
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his flesh.306 In another case, a forty-two-year old Zaghawa
man reported that: “They hung me with hooks piercing my
chest. They also burned me . . . . They tied us [himself and
about thirty other men] together and interrogated us about
animals . . . . [They] shot and slaughtered some of [the men]
in front of my eyes.”307 In a further case, a one hundred-yearold man, Barra Younis, from Terchana, was “burned . . . alive
in his hut.”308 A child and old woman were burned to death
in her house in Kundung by the Janjaweed.309 A seventy-fiveyear old trader from Arwalla was mutilated by the Janjaweed,
who cut the skin on top of his head and ears then threw him
into a fire and left him for dead.310 Torture has continued in
camps controlled by the Janjaweed.311
• Rape: As detailed above, there are numerous eye-witness accounts of rape.312
• Individuals being buried alive: There are reports of men being buried alive around Garsila and Deleig by Janjaweed.313
• Detentions: At Wadi Saleh, men were detained by police or
military personnel, then transferred to trucks and military
cars and transported out of town prior to execution by the
306. Id. at 33.
307. ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 18 (quoting Human Rights Watch
interview in a refugee camp in Chad on July 2, 2005).
308. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 13 (quoting Human Rights Watch interview with Adam in Chad on April 8, 2004).
309. Id. at 24 (citing Human Rights Watch interview in Darfur in April 2004).
310. ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 28 (quoting Human Rights Watch
interview in a refugee camp in Chad on June 27, 2005).
311. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 42.
312. See supra Part II.A.2.f. The ICTR has suggested that rape might also constitute
the underlying crime of inflicting “measures intended to prevent births,” another of
genocide’s underlying crimes:
In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the
identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births
within the group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is
deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have
her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother’s
group.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 1998). Additionally, the rape of large numbers of younger girls who have suffered resulting medical
problems, and the scarring and branding of women, as well as the public infliction of
rape to which often renders the women unfit as marriage partners arguably also constitute “measures intended to prevent births.” Interview with Eric Reeves, supra note 6.
The crime of “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” may also
have occurred based on reports of mass abductions of non-Arab/African children. Id.
313. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 33 (quoting Human Rights Watch
interviews in Darfur in April 2004).
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Janjaweed and government soldiers.314 As part of the January
13-14, 2005 attack on Hamada, the residents were detained in
the village and not allowed to flee, while some of the men
and boys were executed, and some of the women and girls
raped.315
• Denial of humanitarian assistance and displacement in conditions
where there were inadequate supplies of food, medicine or water for
thousands of individuals displaced into camps: The government
of Sudan has denied humanitarian assistance to those displaced. For example, the U.S. Congress has found that:
[T]he Government of Sudan has restricted access by humanitarian and human rights workers to the Darfur area
through intimidation by military and security forces, and
through bureaucratic and administrative obstruction, in
an attempt to inflict the most devastating harm on those
individuals displaced from their villages and homes without any means of sustenance or shelter.316
As clearly documented in U.N. memoranda,317 “[t]he Government of Sudan almost completely banned humanitarian
agencies from Darfur for [at least] four crucial months, from
late October 2003 through late-February 2004.”318 As of May
2006, it was reported that “[t]he Sudanese government and
rebel groups in Darfur [were] hindering humanitarian agencies from reaching hundreds of thousands of civilians dependent on international aid in many areas of Darfur;” at that
point, “the U.N. estimat[ed] that at least 650,000 people
[were] partly or wholly inaccessible to international humanitarian agencies.”319 As mentioned above, civilians displaced
into camps are entirely dependent on humanitarian assis314. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 26.
315. See id. at 55.
316. Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 § 3(11), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006).
317. See Reeves, supra note 7. As of December 8, 2003, Tom Vraalsen, U.N. special
envoy for humanitarian affairs in Sudan, declared in a memo to the U.N. humanitarian
coordinator for Sudan (Mukesh Kapila), that “Khartoum was ‘systematically’ denying
access to areas in which non-Arab/African tribal populations were concentrated. . . .
While [Khartoum’s] authorities claim unimpeded access, they greatly restrict access to
the areas under their control, while imposing blanket denial to all rebel-held areas.”
Id. (citing Tom Vraalsen, Note to the Emergency Relief Coordinator, Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur, December 8, 2003). Reeves estimates that Khartoum’s deliberate
impeding of humanitarian deployment and access, which he states occurred over half a
year, may have cost 100,000 lives. Id.
318. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 50.
319. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR: HUMANITARIAN AID UNDER SIEGE 2 (2006),
available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudan0506/darfur0506.pdf.
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tance.320
• Denial of access to medical treatment: As detailed above, there
are also instances where severely ill or wounded villagers were
denied access to larger towns with hospitals and health
care.321
• Mental suffering: The infliction of all of the above and additional crimes has caused a great deal of mental suffering to
the people of Darfur—their villages were subjected to aerial
bombardment, individuals were attacked, houses were
burned, foodstuffs were looted, cattle were stolen, and individuals were subjected to physical assault, torture, sexual violence, detention, being buried alive, denial of humanitarian
assistance, denial of access to medical treatment and forced
displacement.

Thus, it appears clear that there has been: (a) infliction of
serious bodily harm; (b) infliction of serious mental harm; and
(c) that at least some of the harm was inflicted intentionally. As
to the bodily harm, there can be no doubt that it was “serious.”322 Indeed, case law has already acknowledged that torture,
rape and displacement—crimes that have all occurred in Darfur—constitute “serious bodily harm.”323 Additionally, if the
forced displacement of women, children and elderly from
Srebrenica was held to cause “serious mental harm,”324 then certainly forced displacement accompanied by numerous other
crimes has also caused “serious mental harm” to the people of
Darfur.
3. Deliberately Inflicting On the Group Conditions of Life
Calculated to Bring About Its Physical Destruction in
Whole or in Part
As to the crime of deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
320. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 58-59.
321. See supra Part II.F.1.
322. Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 645 (Jan.
17, 2005) (defining serious bodily harm as “harm that seriously injures the health,
causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or
senses”).
323. See id. ¶ 646 (listing “torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined with beatings, threats of death, and deportation”).
324. See id. ¶ 652.
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whole or in part, the group targeted must be one of the protected groups.325 The conditions inflicted “must be calculated to
bring about the physical destruction of the targeted group in
whole or in part and must be inflicted on it deliberately.”326 As
mentioned above, the crime covers methods of destruction by
which the perpetrator does not immediately kill group members, but which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.327
Acts covered by this crime “include, but are not limited to
. . . subjecting the group to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and denial of the right to medical services;”
“[a]lso included is the creation of circumstances that would lead
to a slow death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing and
hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion.”328 The Rome
Statute’s Elements of Crimes explains that the crime “may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate deprivation
of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical
services, or systematic expulsion from homes.”329
For this underlying crime, it is not required to prove physical destruction in whole or in part of the targeted group.330 In
the Brd–janin case, an ICTY Trial Chamber found that the conditions at various camps and detention facilities “were calculated
to bring about physical destruction [of] Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat detainees and . . . were inflicted deliberately.”331
325. Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 692 (Sept. 1, 2004)
(“The group upon which these conditions are inflicted must be a protected group
under the terms of the Genocide Convention.”).
326. Id.
327. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 518 (July 31, 2003)
(“The Trial Chamber in Akayesu held that the expression [calculated to bring about its
physical destruction] ‘should be construed as the methods of destruction by which the
perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but which, ultimately,
seek their physical destruction.’ ”).
328. Brdd–anin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 691; see also Stakić, Case No. IT-9724-T, Judgment, ¶ 517.
329. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 40, art. 6(c)
(elements of genocide include “deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”).
330. See Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 691 (“ ‘Deliberately inflicting
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part’ under sub-paragraph (c) does not require proof of the physical destruction in whole or in part of the targeted group.”); see also Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24T, Judgment, ¶ 517 (similar).
331. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 909; see id. ¶¶ 909-62 (discussing
the Manjaca camp, the Mlavke football stadium, the Bosanski Novi fire station, the Kotor Varos prison, the Omarska camp, the Keraterm camp, the Trnopolje camp, the
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Here, there is a large amount of factual information showing that the crime of deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part has been committed:
• “Scorched-earth tactics:” As mentioned above, both Human
Rights Watch and the U.S. Congress have categorized the
joint attacks by the Sudanese armed forces and Janjaweed militias as “scorched-earth tactics.”332 Virtually nothing remains
of the villages attacked—items essential for survival are systematically destroyed.333
• Janjaweed burned villages, looted and stole cattle: As part of
these “scorched-earth tactics, there are countless eye-witness
accounts of Janjaweed burning villages,334 looting,335 and
Sloga shoe factory, the Betonirka factory garages, the Pribinic camp, and the Territorial
defense building in Teslic municipality).
332. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 7; see also Comprehensive Peace in
Sudan Act of 2004 § 3(8), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006).
333. DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 2 Similarly:
Human Rights Watch research in Darfur in March and April 2004 confirmed
reports from refugees in Chad and other sources that Sudanese government
forces and Janjaweed have systematically attacked and destroyed villages, food
stocks, water sources and other items essential for the survival of Fur and
Masalit villagers in large parts of West Darfur.
Id. at 26.
334. Id. at 9 (on August 30, 2003, soldiers and Janjaweed attacked and burned
Mororo); id. at 10 (Mororo was later burned a second time); id. (eye-witness to attack in
the Murnei area: “They burned everything, looted everything.”); id. (Murnei was later
burned a second time); id. at 11 (“In November 2003, Janjaweed attacked at least four
villages close to Mango - Angar, Bayda, Nyorongta and Shushta – and remained in the
villages after burning them.”); id. (“The villages burned included Gororg, Dureysa,
Tirja, Maliam, Mororo, Gorra and Korkojok,” said thirty-seven-year-old Ahmad, a former Urum resident.); id. at 13 (village in the Bareh area, east of Geneina burned); id.
at 14 (Habila Canare, east of El Geneina burned); id. at 15 (Kondoli, in the Misterei
area burned); id. at 17 (as to Kenyu, near Fobranga: “Everything was burned”; “[o]n
the same day they burned Buranga”); id. (thirty villages of Sildi were looted and
burned); id. at 18 (in Tunfuka, south of Murnei, they burned the village); id. at 19
(Janjaweed burned Tullus); id. at 20 (at Terbeba, the army burned houses); id. at 22 (a
large area of Wadi Salih was burned: “Dozens of villages around Deleig have been
burned by the government”); id. at 23 (both Bindisi and Kudung were partly burned
and destroyed); id. at 25 (only one hut in Korkoria was unburned); id. at 26 (“[i]n one
of the areas systematically surveyed by Human Rights Watch in April [2004],” all villages
were partially or totally burned).
335. Id. at 10 (eye-witness to attack in the Murnei area; “They . . . looted everything.”); id. at 20 (at Terbeba, the army stole some grain and burned the rest); id. at 23
(as to both Bindisi and Kudung, the market and shops were totally looted); see id. at 26
(“Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed have systematically attacked and destroyed villages, food stocks, water sources and other items essential for the survival of
Fur and Masalit villagers in large parts of West Darfur.”); id. (in one of the areas system-
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stealing cattle.”336 The looting, for example, was clearly organized and premeditated. Army troops and Janjaweed have
been told they could keep their looted goods if they “fight
well.”337 A former government soldier clarified the policy:
“You keep what you have taken. It applies to the officers too.
One exception: the animals. The animals are given to
Janjaweed nomads who keep them. Then they are sold.”338
• Food stocks were systematically destroyed: As part of the
“scorched–earth tactics,” food stocks have been systematically
destroyed.339
• Putting dead bodies down wells to contaminate water supply:
There have been accounts of Janjaweed putting dead bodies
down wells in Darfur in order to contaminate water supplies.340
• Destroying mosques and Korans: As discussed above,341 there
are accounts of Government and Janjaweed forces having
burned at least sixty-five mosques in Dar Masalit, killed people in mosques as well as imams, and defecated on Korans.342
• Denial of access to medical treatment: As discussed above, witnesses have stated that severely ill or wounded villagers were
atically surveyed by Human Rights Watch in April [2004], “[f]ood storage containers
and other items necessary for the storage and preparation of food were all destroyed”).
336. Id. at 9 (on August 30, 2003, soldiers and Janjaweed attacked and burned
Mororo, stealing cattle); id. at 11 (in one village in the Mango cluster, Mango Buratta,
soldiers and Janjaweed stole all the cattle in the village); id. at 12 (eyewitnesses reported
in November 2003, that Janjaweed came to Urum and took 3,000 head of cattle); id. at
18 (in Tunfuka, south of Murnei, they rounded up the cattle); id. at 20 (at Terbeba, the
army stole 1,000 cattle); see id. at 31 (discussing the lucrative business of cattle rustling);
see also ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 6 (estimating in total the theft of millions of livestock).
337. ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 20 (quoting Human Rights Watch
interview with former African Union military observer in the Netherlands on Sept. 15,
2005).
338. Id. at 20 (quoting Human Rights Watch interview with government soldier in
SLA custody in North Darfur on July 14, 2005).
339. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 26 (“Sudanese government forces and
Janjaweed have systematically attacked and destroyed villages, food stocks, water sources
and other items essential for the survival of Fur and Masalit villagers in large parts of
West Darfur.”); id. (in one of the areas systematically surveyed by Human Rights Watch
in April [2004], “[f]ood storage containers and other items necessary for the storage
and preparation of food were all destroyed”).
340. Interview with Eric Reeves, supra note 6. Congress has referred to the
“poisoning of . . . wells.” Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 § 3(9), 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (2006).
341. See supra Part II.A.2.
342. See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 8, at 28.
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denied access to hospitals and health care.343
• Others are resettled into the areas formerly occupied by the African
tribes: The return of those displaced has largely been prevented by resettlement of Janjaweed and other Arab ethnic
groups in areas previously populated by Masalit and Fur.344
• Denial of humanitarian assistance: As described above, the
Government of Sudan has denied humanitarian assistance to
those displaced.
• Rape and other forms of sexual violence: As discussed above,
large numbers of rapes and other forms of sexual violence
have occurred.345

Here, it certainly appears that these conditions were both
(a) calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the
targeted groups in whole or in part, and (b) inflicted deliberately. As to the acts that have been deemed to be covered by this
crime, case law has included, for instance: subjecting the group
to a subsistence diet; systematic expulsion from homes; denial of
the right to medical services; lack of proper housing and clothing346—all crimes present here. Thus, it is quite clear that this
underlying crime has been committed.
Accordingly, factual information gathered as to the crimes
committed in Darfur clearly shows the dolus specialis of genocide:
(1) intent to destroy; (2) in whole or in part; (3) the Fur, Masalit
and Zaghawa ethnic groups; (4) as such. Arguments that the
extensive displacement negates “intent to destroy,” or that other
motives were at issue than destruction, are rebuttable or legally
incorrect. The facts also clearly show that at least three of genocide’s underlying crimes have been committed (any one of
which would suffice for a legal case): killing, serious bodily or
mental harm, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calcu343. Id. at 35.
344. Id. at 40. As explained by Human Rights Watch:
[T]he land on which displaced persons and refugees once lived has become
free for the taking, open to use and occupation by the ethnic groups comprising the Janjaweed, by new arrivals fleeing a linked conflict in neighboring
Chad, and by others. Land occupation serves to consolidate the ethnic cleansing campaign, and greatly threatens the prospects for long-term peace in the
region.
CHAOS BY DESIGN, supra note 2, at 22.
345. See infra Part II.A.2.f.
346. Prosecutor v. Brd–janin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 691 (Sept. 1, 2004);
see Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 517 (July 31, 2003).
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lated to destroy the group in whole or in part. Thus, while this
Article does not take the additional step of examining individual
criminal responsibility—as a criminal case would be required to—
the law and facts strongly indicate that genocide has indeed
occurred.347
III. THE NEED TO SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT IN ITS PROSECUTION EFFORTS
Even if the crimes in Darfur are genocide, however, that
does not necessarily mean they should be prosecuted as such in
the current situation. Ideally, of course, they would be. Yet, it is
one thing to acknowledge something as genocide, and another
to bring a prosecution against an individual—proving that individual’s genocidal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. It is furthermore, a much more difficult step to do so where the investigation is being impeded by the Government of the country
who’s cooperation the Prosecutor would need in order to obtain
documentary evidence and investigate on the ground. Because
of the difficulties in the instant situation, this Article urges the
ICC Prosecutor to consider charging the crime of genocide, but
does not argue emphatically that he need do so.
Under the current circumstances, even if the ICC does not
charge the crime of genocide, it will need strong support from
the international community in order to succeed in any of its
Darfur prosecutions. As noted above, the ICC has already issued
arrest warrants for two individuals charged with war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in Darfur—Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior and current Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd Al Rahman (known as Ali Kushayb), a Janjaweed
militia leader.348 The Government of Sudan opposes ICC prosecutions and has refused to execute the warrants.349 Thus, the
347. While this approach is somewhat artificial, it follows that of the ICTY and
ICTR which “have undertaken a threshold inquiry of whether genocide writ large occurred in the region in which the individual was operating. Then, the tribunals consider whether the particular defendant possessed genocidal intent.” Van Schaack, supra
note 7, at n.110.
348. See Sixth Report, supra note 13, ¶ 2.
349. For example, rather than executing the ICC’s warrant for Harun, Sudan’s
president Omar Bashir has refused to turn him over and instead put him on a committee overseeing deployment of the new peacekeeping mission. See generally Delay, Obstruction and Darfur, supra note 35. As mentioned above, the Government of Sudan has also
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ICC’s Darfur investigation is quite different, for example, than
its investigations regarding crimes in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Uganda and the Central African Republic. All three of
those countries had joined the Rome Statute, and their Governments invited the ICC Prosecutor to open investigations.350 Sudan, by contrast, has not joined the Rome Statute; the situation
was referred to the ICC not by the Sudan, but by the U.N. Security Council;351 and the Government of Sudan is openly hostile to
the ICC’s work. Thus, if there are to be any successful ICC prosecutions of the crimes in Darfur—which there most emphatically should be—a great deal of international pressure must be
used to ensure that the Government of Sudan cooperates with
the ICC (including in executing arrest warrants), as it is currently obligated to do by Security Council resolution.352
Serious attention should also be paid to the number of individuals being prosecuted. To date, the ICC has issued two public
arrest warrants (although perhaps more are under seal). Given
the magnitude of the crimes committed, two prosecutions (or
even a few more),353 would hardly suffice as “doing justice.”354
recently given a government post to Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal, who is implicated in
various crimes. See Sudan Gives Advisor Role to Militia Leader, supra note 136.
350. See Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the
Democratic Republic
of Congo (Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.iss-cpt.int/pressrelease_details&id=19&1=en.html; Press Release, ICC President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2005), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=16&1=en.html; Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor
Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic (Jan. 7, 2005), http://www.icccpt.int/pressrelease_details&id=87&1=en.html.
351. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). A day after ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo on June 6, 2005 announced that the ICC would investigate the crimes in Darfur, Sudan announced the establishment of the Special National
Criminal Court for Darfur. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at 68-69. The
timing of the announcement suggests there will be an attempt by Sudan to avoid the
ICC’s jurisdiction by raising a challenge under Article 17 of the Rome Statute. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 40, art. 17.
352. See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (the U.N.
Security Council decided “that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the
conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance”) (emphasis added).
353. The International Commission of Inquiry compiled a list of fifty-one names of
individuals who should be investigated for crimes in Darfur. See Commission of Inquiry,
supra note 7, ¶ 645. Human Rights Watch has named at least twenty-two. See ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY, supra note 10, at Annex 1 (“Partial list of individuals who should
be investigated by the ICC,” naming seven Sudanese national officials, including President Bashir; five current or former regional officials; four Sudanese military commanders and six Janjaweed militia leaders).
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Furthermore, under the current regime in Sudan, one can
hardly rely upon Sudanese courts to prosecute additional
cases.355
The way forward requires: (a) the Government of Sudan
and Janjaweed militias to end all attacks; (b) immediate security needs being met by successful deployment of the combined
African Union
and U.N. “hybrid” peacekeeping force
(“UNAMID”);356 (c) eventually, a political solution for the people of Darfur; (d) containment of the violence in Chad and the
Central African Republic; (e) strong support for the ICC’s Darfur prosecution; and (f) eventually, additional justice efforts.
CONCLUSION
The facts clearly suggest that the crimes committed in Darfur are genocide. All of the elements of the dolus specialis (special mental state) of genocide are present, and at least three of
genocide’s underlying crimes have clearly been committed. The
United States was correct when it determined the situation to be
genocide.357 It is disappointing that international actors, such as
the U.N. and/or NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, have not
taken that step. Not that it should matter what mass killing is
called before it is stopped; yet, it might have facilitated the situation had the decision been made earlier to identify the crimes as
genocide. Of course, the more urgent priority is stopping the
crimes—which has still not been achieved—due in large part to
China’s shameful threat over the last several years to veto forceful U.N. deployment of troops in Darfur,358 and Sudanese stalling of the agreement to consensual deployment of U.N. troops.
354. As is often quoted: it is “of fundamental importance that justice should not only
be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” King v. Sussex Justices, Ex
parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER 233 (emphasis added).
355. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, National Courts Have Done Nothing
in Darfur: ICC Prosecution Needed; Government Must Hand Over Suspects (June 11,
2007),
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/06/11/sudan16110.htm;
HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, LACK OF CONVICTION: THE SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT ON THE EVENTS IN
DARFUR (2006) (the briefing paper examines the operations of the court, which was
purportedly established by the Sudanese government to address the crimes in Darfur).
356. The Security Council has authorized a January 1, 2008 deployment of 26,000
peacekeepers to replace the 7000 African Union peacekeepers (“AMIS”) that have been
in Sudan. See Delay, Obstruction and Darfur, supra note 35.
357. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
358. “Russia and China have often supported the Sudanese government [at the
Security Council] because of ideological commitments (non-interference in internal
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The world must start to act forcefully in the face of genocide,
and take seriously the “responsibility to protect.” How can one
keep saying “never again,” after the Holocaust occurs, and
Rwanda’s genocide occurs and Darfur’s genocide occurs?

affairs of member states) and both have economic interests in Sudan.” HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 3.

